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Introduction
In 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued
proposed rules regarding the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts for financial goods and services. One of these
rules—barring class action waivers in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses—attracted substantial attention. Much less noticed was the CFPB’s
second proposed rule (“Arbitration Reporting Proposal”) requiring
regulated providers of financial products and services to report to the CFPB
regarding their use and the outcomes of arbitrations conducted pursuant to
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The Arbitration Reporting
Proposal also proposed to make such information public, with appropriate
redactions.1
The American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution (“the
Section”) submitted comments strongly supporting the CFPB’s Arbitration
Reporting Proposal. In the course of preparing the Section’s comments, it
also became clear to the author of this Article that dispute resolution
neutrals and organizations should have an affirmative ethical obligation to
1. There have also been legislative efforts to increase the transparency of mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration. See, e.g., H.R. 832, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (also known as the
“Arbitration Transparency Act”) (proposing to amend section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act to require arbitrations between financial institutions and consumers to be open to the
public); S. 647, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (known as the “Mandatory Arbitration
Transparency Act”) (proposing to amend Title 9 to ban pre-dispute agreements that provide
for arbitration of employment, consumer, or civil rights if the agreements bar parties from
contacting state or federal agencies regarding unlawful conduct or other issues of public
policy or public concern, deeming such agreements to be “unfair or deceptive act[s] or
practices” under the Federal Trade Commission Act, instructing the FTC to issue new rules
and punish violators, and creating a private right of action for aggrieved consumers).
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support responsible—“measured”—transparency regarding the use and
outcomes of the processes they provide and promote in order to protect the
public and these processes’ integrity. Most particularly, dispute resolution
neutrals (including mediators, arbitrators, ombuds, and providers of online
dispute resolutions services) should have an ethical obligation to support
transparency when their processes are imposed upon people pursuant to
judicial or legislative mandates or by contracts of adhesion, and when the
outcomes that dispute resolution neutrals help to produce will be granted
the privileges of narrow and deferential judicial review and expedited
judicial enforcement.2
2. Professor Judith Resnik has also recently called for increased transparency
regarding ADR, observing:
[H]ere, as part of a larger project addressing the impact of new procedural
forms, I argue for shaping First Amendment doctrine in light of commitments
that courts function as open, egalitarian venues. Even if the parties, judges, and
other neutrals believe in the benefits of closure, and even when parties consent,
court promotion of ADR, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, ought to
be accompanied by public accountings of what transpires. . . . [T]he presence of
the state infuses all these forms of ADR, which are mandated, advocated, and
structured through hundreds of court rules, government manuals, and websites,
and are commended to litigants by judges. The result of these many new rules
is not “bargaining in the shadow of the law,” but bargaining as a requirement of
the law. . . . As procedure is increasingly becoming contract, state-promoted
contracting—produced at the behest of the state and shaped through judicial
intervention—needs regulation through public oversight and participation. . . .
The issue is which activities ought to have what Justice Brennan termed the
“public character of judicial proceedings.”. . . Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the plurality in [Richmond Newspapers], spoke about the “nexus between
openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness.” He commented further that
“[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions,
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing.”. . . When [judges] convene meetings in courts, when they take on
the role of “neutrals” or authorize others to do so with “quasi-judicial” status,
their decisions and their procedures are the state, in action. As more of the
activity of “the judicial” moves to become “quasi-judicial,” the public needs to
be built in, so as to be able to be present [for] at least some aspects of the
proceedings and to know the results.
Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and
Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L. J. 1631, 1683-85 (2015)
(quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570, 572, 592 (1980))
[hereinafter Resnik, The Contingency of Openness]; see also Laurie Kratky Dore, Public
Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 465-66 (2006) (suggesting that courts’ increased
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Now is a particularly good time to consider the ethical obligations of one
set of dispute resolution neutrals: mediators. This is because the Section,
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), and the Association for
Conflict Resolution (“ACR”) are currently considering whether to review
and revise the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators. Courts and
legislatures regularly mandate parties’ participation in mediation.
Mandatory pre-dispute mediation clauses are now turning up in the same
contracts that contain mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses.3
Courts reliably enforce mediated settlement agreements, generally with
little review.4 Mediation is also the subject of substantial recent
international activity. On December 20, 2018, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted an international convention for the expedited
enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. The convention will be
open for signatures in Singapore in August 2019.5
commitment to transparency may have had the unintended effect of diverting more cases to
arbitration and mediation); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,
485, 494 (2011) (pointing to delegation of legislative power to a private party, also pointing
out lack of transparency, opacity); Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to
Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV.
605, 629-30 (2018) [hereinafter Resnik, A2J] (“My focus is on the impact of these shifts to
[mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, ODR, and settlement] on access to
knowledge about justice-seeking [processes].”).
3. See Alliance for Justice, Lost in the Fine Print (HD), YOUTUBE (Oct. 6, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgC3N802Sjk (picturing a contract that includes a
mediation clause just before the arbitration clause).
4. See James R. Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy: Judicial Abdication to
Class Action Mediators, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 162, 168-69 (2013) (describing cases in
which courts state that class action settlements are entitled to a presumption of fairness if
they were reached in mediation); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of SelfDetermination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,
6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 59-78 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Thinning Vision]; James R.
Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About
Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 74 (2006).
5. The United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting
from Mediation will be known as the "Singapore Convention on Mediation." See General
Assembly Adopts the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements
Resulting from Mediation at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2018/
unisl271.html. The Singapore Convention is modeled upon the New York Convention,
which requires signatory nations’ courts to recognize and enforce international commercial
arbitration awards with only narrow grounds for the denial of such enforcement. Article 1 of
the Singapore Convention specifically excludes employment, family, and consumer matters.
See REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON THE
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This Article will begin by describing the event that triggered the
Section’s consideration of transparency—the CFPB’s announcement of its
Arbitration Reporting Proposal. The Article will also detail the Proposal’s
subsequent history, including its promulgation and repeal. The Article will
then turn to the transparency that exists or has been proposed for various
dispute resolution processes. For example, the Article will consider the
transparency that (1) federal and state courts provide regarding their court
filings and outcomes; (2) some states, some federal agencies, and some
domestic and international dispute resolution organizations now require or
provide regarding the use and outcomes of arbitration (and to a lesser
degree, mediation); (3) some users of dispute resolution achieve through
“self-help” initiatives; and (4) some commentators have proposed for online
dispute resolution. Finally, the Article will consider whether the ethical
principles that currently apply to mediators establish an affirmative ethical
obligation to support transparency, at least under certain circumstances.
Concluding that the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators do not
establish such an ethical obligation, the Article will end with a proposal to
establish mediators’ ethical obligation to support transparency to a
responsible degree when mediations are mandated by courts, legislatures, or
contracts of adhesion and the resulting mediated settlement agreements are
subject to only narrow and deferential judicial review or are granted
expedited judicial enforcement. In particular, the Article will argue for the
creation of a set of customized Model Standards for “imposed mediation.”
I. The Precipitating Event: The CFPB’s Arbitration Reporting Proposal
The use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer
transactions and employment contracts has elicited substantial controversy
in the general public, the courts, and the dispute resolution field. It has also
been the subject of countless articles in law reviews6 and professional
journals.7
WORK OF ITS FIFTY-FIRST SESSION:

REPORT OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE 11 (Nov. 7, 2018) at
https://undocs.org/en/A/73/496. The UNCITRAL Working Group’s documents regarding
the Singapore Convention are available at Working Group II: 2000 to Present: Arbitration
and Conciliation / Dispute Settlement, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/
en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). For additional
resources regarding the Singapore Convention, see infra note 153.
6. Regarding the general topic of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in a disparate party
context, see, for example, Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural
Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939 (2014); Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Combating Structural Bias
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in Dispute System Designs that Use Arbitration: Transparency, the Universal Sanitizer, 6
Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 32 (2014); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal
Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5–6
(2008); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits
of Arbitral Authority: Lessons from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99 (2007);
Darren P. Lindamood, Comment, Redressing the Arbitration Process: An Alternative to the
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291 (2010); Victor D.
Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Binding Arbitration Clauses Are
Unjust: Ethical Implications for Dispute System Design in the Time of Vanishing Trials, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2119, 2146 (2017) (reporting empirical research showing that as members
of the public learn more about mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, the more they believe it to
be unjust and illegitimate, and urging the adoption of a more inclusive, more virtuous ethical
ideal for transactional attorneys to encourage them to “craft and design adhesion contracts
[that] balance both the interests of their client with the needs and perspective of the public”);
Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from
Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (2007); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); Stephen J. Ware, The
Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, 23 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 29
(2017); Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010).
Regarding mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration in particular, see Sarah R. Cole &
Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals,
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009); Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The
Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48
HOUS. L. REV. 457 (2011); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in
Arbitration and in Court, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77 (2011); Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Non-Consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 871 (2008); Myriam Gilles,
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action,
104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005); Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme
Court’s Flawed Understanding of Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111
(2015); David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57 (2015); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:
The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights,
124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]; Amy J. Schmitz,
Curing Consumers’ Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 627 (2008); Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data
in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (2010); Jeff Sovern et al.,
“Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1 (2015); Jean R.
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting
Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami:
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012);
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As part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Congress specifically authorized the CFPB to
issue regulations that would “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations”
on mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses in contracts for
THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON CONSUMER
AND EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CONSUMER ARBITRATION ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY
REPORT (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/dispute_
resolution/roundtable2012.authcheckdam.pdf; Nancy A. Welsh, Class Action-Barring
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses: An Example of (and Opportunity
for) Dispute System Design?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 381 (2017) [hereinafter Welsh, Class
Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses]; Nancy A. Welsh,
Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural
Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187 (2012) [hereinafter Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer
Arbitration]; Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded
Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395 (2010) [hereinafter Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough”];
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
44–45 (Univ. of Kan. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2011-4) [hereinafter Drahozal &
Zyontz, Private Regulation].
Regarding mandatory pre-dispute employment arbitration, see Michael Z. Green,
Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for
Employment Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 454–59 (2000); Michael Z.
Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate
Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 59 (2007); Martin H. Malin, The
Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87
IND. L.J. 289, 312 (2012); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a
Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective
Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985 (2012)
[hereinafter Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index].
Regarding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in social media agreements, see
Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643 (2012);
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Fundamentally Unfair: An Empirical Analysis of
Social Media Arbitration Clauses, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 341 (2014).
7. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer
Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at 30; David B. Lipsky, The New York Times’
Attack on Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2016, at 6; Lisa Renee Pomerantz,
Consumer Arbitration: Pre-Dispute Resolution Clauses and Class Action Waivers,
ACRESOLUTION MAG., Fall 2015, at 16; Nancy A. Welsh & David B. Lipsky, “Moving the
Ball Forward” in Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution: What Can Planning,
Talking, Listening and Breaking Bread Together Accomplish?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring
2013, at 14 [hereinafter Welsh & Lipsky, “Moving the Ball Forward”]; Nancy A. Welsh &
Stephan J. Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The Story Behind the Spread of
Class Action-Barring Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, DISP. RESOL. MAG.,
Fall 2014, at 18.
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financial products or services as long as the CFPB found that doing so was
“in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.” 8 Congress also
required the CFPB to conduct a study of mandatory arbitration. Any
regulatory findings made by the CFPB had to be consistent with the study.9
The CFPB conducted its empirical study and issued its final, voluminous
report in March 2015 (“March 2015 Report”).10 In May 2016, the CFPB
announced its proposed rules.11
One portion of the CFPB’s proposed rules—in which the CFPB barred
class action waivers in mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration
clauses—garnered substantial attention. The other portion of the CFPB’s
proposed rules—section 1040.4(b), or the Arbitration Reporting Proposal—
remained largely under the radar. This portion dealt with the issue of
transparency. The CFPB proposed to require regulated providers of
financial products and services to report information regarding their use and
the outcomes of arbitrations conducted pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. Specifically, the Arbitration Reporting Proposal
required submission, with redaction of individuals’ names and other
information, of the following five types of documents:
(1) the initial claim (whether filed by a consumer or by the
provider) and any counterclaim; (2) the pre-dispute arbitration
agreement filed with the arbitrator or arbitration administrator;
(3) the award, if any, issued by the arbitrator or arbitration
administrator; (4) any communications from the arbitrator or
arbitration administrator with whom the claim was filed relating
to a refusal to administer or dismissal of a claim due to the
8. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012). The Dodd-Frank Act also amended the Truth in Lending
Act to impose a ban on the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in certain residential
mortgage loan agreements.
9. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR
POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER
CONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/
f/201510_cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packet-explaining-the-proposal-underconsideration.pdf [hereinafter CFPB, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR
POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS].
10. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT §
1028(A) (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-tocongress-2015.pdf [hereinafter CFPB Report].
11. This step was preceded by the CFPB’s submission of its tentative proposed rules to
a Small Business Review Panel in November 2015.
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provider’s failure to pay required fees; and (5) any
communications related to a determination that an arbitration
agreement does not comply with the administrator’s fairness
principles.12
The CFPB also proposed to publish these materials on its website in some
form, with appropriate redaction or aggregation.13
For most of the CFPB’s proposed requirements, the agency’s reasoning
was, and remains, fairly apparent. However, the required reporting of
communications regarding failure to comply with dispute resolution
administrators’ fairness principles deserves further explanation. In April
1998, the AAA’s National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee
produced A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Consumer Disputes to guide the use of ADR processes to resolve consumer
disputes.14 The Protocol’s Statement of Principles asserted parties’
12. Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,868-69 (proposed May 24, 2016)
(to be codified at 12 C.R.F. pt. 1040).
13. See id.; see also CFPB, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL
RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, supra note 9, at 20 (“The Bureau is considering
a proposal to require covered entities that use arbitration agreements in their contracts with
consumers to submit initial claim filings and written awards in consumer finance arbitration
proceedings to the Bureau through a process the Bureau would expect to establish as part of
this rulemaking. The Bureau is also considering whether to publish the claims or awards to
its website, making them available to the public. Before collecting or publishing any arbitral
claims or awards, the Bureau would ensure that these activities comply with privacy
considerations.”) The CFPB anticipates that regulated entities would be required to submit to
the Bureau “an electronic file with documents that the entity already possesses” that may
also be redacted. Id. at 25.
The CFPB currently makes data publicly available regarding the complaints it receives
from consumers about financial services companies’ alleged unfair, deceptive, or abusive
acts or processes. Researchers have used this database in order to identify demographic
differences in consumer complaints and in companies’ responses to consumer complaints.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early
Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343, 363-67
(2014) (reporting that mortgage complaints per mortgage were significantly higher in ZIP
codes with larger proportions of African Americans, Latinos, and senior citizens, and that
companies were less timely in responding to consumers located in areas with higher
concentrations of college students).
14. See NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1, 1-3 (1998),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer%20Due%20Process
%20Protocol%20(1).pdf [hereinafter CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES]; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, ADDRESSING DISPUTES IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
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entitlement to a “fundamentally-fair ADR process,” with the Principles
serving as “embodiments of fundamental fairness.”15 The Protocol
provided, among other things, for “independent and impartial” neutrals and
administration; consumers’ continued access to small claims court;
reasonable costs for consumers (including consideration of their ability to
pay); “arbitrator-supervised exchange of information”; consumers’ access
to all remedies available in courts of law and equity; and consumers’ access
(upon request) to written explanations of arbitral awards.16 The Protocol
also strongly encouraged the use of mediation.17 It did not address class
action waivers. The AAA subsequently conditioned its provision of service
upon compliance with the Protocol18 and, over the years, has been removed
FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 36 n.50 (2002); Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2852–53 (observing that the AAA’s decisions to
produce the protocol “imposing fee schedules with caps, to create ethical standards, and to
revise its rules and fee schedules” represented “matters of ‘internal policy’” while other selfregulatory initiatives—like the adoption of ethical principles, the commitment to diversity,
and information disclosure and dissemination—also represent “choices” that are not
universally followed by ADR providers; also reporting that many social media arbitration
clauses do “not meet the ‘due process fairness tests’ of the AAA”).
15. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 1,
9.
16. Id. at 1–3.
17. Id. at 2. The complete list of principles contained in the Protocol are:
1. Fundamentally fair process
2. Access to information regarding ADR program
3. Independent and impartial neutral; independent administration
4. Quality and competence of neutrals
5. Small claims
6. Reasonable cost
7. Reasonably convenient location
8. Reasonable time limits
9. Right to representation
10. Mediation
11. Agreements to arbitrate
12. Arbitration hearings
13. Access to information
14. Arbitral remedies
15. Arbitration awards
Id. at 1–3. The Protocol does not address class action waivers.
18. See AAA Statement of Ethical Principles, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/
StatementofEthicalPrinciples (last visited Dec. 11, 2018). It provides:
! For consumer cases with claims under $75,000, the AAA reviews the
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from some consumer agreements due to businesses’ unwillingness to abide
by the principles contained in the Protocol.19 Presumably, such removals
involved communications regarding the AAA’s determination that the
businesses’ consumer arbitration clauses did not meet the requirements of
the Due Process Protocol. The CFPB proposed to require the submission of
these communications.20
The ABA Section of Dispute Resolution had examined mandatory predispute consumer arbitration at various points over the years.21 With some
limited exceptions for particular applications,22 the Section’s Council had
contract clause to determine if it substantially and materially deviates
from the Consumer Due Process Protocol. The AAA reserves the right
to refuse to administer arbitrations with consumer clauses that violate
the Consumer Due Process Protocol.
! Pursuant to the AAA's National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes, employers submit pre-dispute, corporate employment
programs naming the AAA to the AAA for review to determine that the
programs do not substantially and materially deviate from the
Employment Due Process Protocol. The AAA reserves the right to
decline its administrative services if the employer does not submit its
plan for review or if the program does not comply with the Due Process
Protocol.
Id.; see also Drahozal & Zyontz, Private Regulation, supra note 6, at 91 (reporting the
results of first empirical study of the AAA’s enforcement of its Consumer Due Process
Protocol and finding that the AAA’s review of arbitration clauses for protocol compliance
appears to be effective at identifying and responding to those clauses with protocol
violations); Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 6, at 91 (observing that the “prophylactic
steps” resulting from the AAA’s adoption and enforcement of its Consumer Due Process
Protocols may make the AAA “more amenable to consumer plaintiffs than other venues”);
STIPANOWICH ET AL., supra note 6, at 48 (“Importantly, AAA reviews arbitration clauses for
their compliance with the Due Process Protocol. When AAA has found deviation from the
Protocol, it has rejected cases or has required the company to agree to correct deficiencies.”).
19. See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 14,
at 11.
20. Id. at 10.
21. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, To Regulate or Not to Regulate, or (Better Still) When
to Regulate, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2013, at 12 (part of a themed issue entitled
“Considering Regulation of ADR”); STIPANOWICH ET AL., supra note 6; SECTION OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE CONSUMER ARBITRATION
STUDY GROUP (2010).
22. For example, the Section’s Council voted to support a proposed ABA House of
Delegates resolution (Resolution 111B) opposing the use of mandatory, binding, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements between nursing homes and residents or their agents and supporting
legislation and regulations invalidating such arbitration agreements. The House of Delegates
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been unable to achieve a general consensus on whether to support or oppose
mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration.23 Due to the importance of the
CFPB’s proposed rules to the dispute resolution field, however, the Section
decided to try again. The Section’s Council established a CFPB Review
Task Force, composed of experienced and well-respected dispute resolution
practitioners and academics knowledgeable regarding mandatory predispute arbitration (particularly consumer arbitration),24 to review the
CFPB’s proposals25 and provide advice to the Section. The subsequent
deliberations of the Section’s Executive Committee and Council were
informed by the Task Force’s report.26
After such deliberations, the Section’s Council voted to express its
strong support for the CFPB’s Arbitration Reporting Proposal. In comments
submitted to the CFPB in July 2016,27 the Section noted the current lack of
complete and consistent information regarding consumer arbitration and the
need for such information. The Section referenced the CFPB’s March 2015
report, in which the agency concluded that although it had a “reasonably
complete picture of the claims that consumers are willing to file in
arbitration where arbitration is an available option,”28 its analysis was
adopted this resolution in February 2009. More recently, the Section’s Council also voted to
support a proposed ABA House of Delegates resolution (Resolution 300) urging legal
employers not to require mandatory arbitration of claims of sexual harassment. The House of
Delegates adopted this resolution in August 2019.
23. See Welsh, Class Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration
Clauses, supra note 6, at 381-86 (describing history of Section’s attempts to develop a
policy and protocols on mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration); Welsh & Lipsky,
“Moving the Ball Forward,” supra note 7, at 14 (describing position taken by Section
Council on Arbitration Fairness Act and its aftermath).
24. The CFPB Review Task Force consisted of Nancy Welsh (Chair), Lisa Amsler,
Louis Burke, Ben Davis, Homer Larue, Bruce Meyerson, Lawrence Mills, Peter Phillips,
Colin Rule, Jean Sternlight, Thomas Stipanowich, and Beth Trent.
25. At this point, the CFPB had released tentative proposals as part of a review by the
Small Business Review Panel. See CFPB, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY REVIEW PANEL FOR
POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, supra note 9 (regarding Small
Business Review Panel).
26. WELSH ET AL., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION FROM THE CFPB REVIEW TASK FORCE (on file with author).
27. Pursuant to Council direction, the Section sought and won permission from the
ABA (through its “blanket authority” procedure) to submit comments to the CFPB. See
Nancy A. Welsh, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule of
Arbitration Agreements (July 29, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB2016-0020-5905 [hereinafter Welsh, Comment Letter].
28. CFPB REPORT, supra note 10, § 5.1, at 4.
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subject to limitations. To a large extent, these limitations derived from the
paucity of complete and consistent information regarding the numbers,
types of claims, outcomes, arbitrators, parties, and party representatives
involved in arbitrations conducted pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute
consumer arbitration clauses. The Section concluded that “despite the
prevalence of mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses, the
public generally has little information regarding use of the process or its
outcomes.”29
Specifically, the Section noted that the CFPB had been forced to rely on
data from a single source—the AAA—that “voluntarily provided its case
filings to the CFPB pursuant to a non-disclosure agreement.”30 While there
was “substantial evidence that the AAA dominate[d] the administration of
consumer financial arbitration cases[,]”31 the CFPB had pointed out in its
March 2015 report that other dispute resolution organizations also
administered consumer financial arbitration.32 The Section found it
significant that “only 18.3% of storefront payday-loan contracts, 16.7% of
private student loan contracts, and 37.3% of prepaid cards studied by the
CFPB provided for the AAA as the sole administrator, while most contracts
identified the AAA as either the sole administrator or one of the available
choices.”33 The CFPB had noted that “the types of claims handled by other
providers might differ from the claims evidenced in the AAA filings, but
due to the lack of required reporting, the CFPB had no means to determine
whether such differences existed.”34 As a result, “the AAA might not be the

29. Welsh, Comment Letter, supra note 27, at 2.
30. Id. at 2-3.
31. Id. at 3, 10 n.10 (“[T]he AAA is specified as at least one potential choice of
contractually-specified arbitration administrators in 98.5% of the credit card market we
studied; 98.9% of the checking account market we studied; 100% of the GPR prepaid card
market we studied; 85.5% of the storefront payday loan market we studied; and 66.7% of the
private student loan agreements we reviewed. The AAA is specified as the sole choice in
17.9% of the GPR prepaid card market that we studied; 44.6% of the checking account
market we studied; and one of the private student loan agreements we reviewed. With that
said . . . when we reviewed the court records of class cases in which parties moved to
compel arbitration, we found five records indicating a subsequent filing with the AAA and
four indicating a filing in JAMS.” (quoting CFPB REPORT, supra note 10, § 5.1, at 4 n.5)).
32. Id. at 3, 10 n.11 (“The CFPB specifically named JAMS, Inc., but it is very likely
that there are also other dispute resolution providers handling these cases.”).
33. Id. at 3 (citing CFPB REPORT, supra note 10, § 2.5.3, at 35-39).
34. Id.
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dominant administrator of arbitration in consumer financial contexts that
were not studied by the CFPB.”35
The CFPB acknowledged other difficulties with the data upon which it
relied for its report, including the following shortcomings: ambiguity in
defining what should count as a “win” for a consumer or company; a lack
of information regarding the cases in which arbitrators did not make awards
or in which the parties settled;36 and a lack of information regarding the
outcomes of cases that did not proceed to arbitration or did not result in
awards.
Ultimately, the Section was troubled by the lack of complete and
consistent information regarding consumer arbitration and believed there
was a need for such information.
The Section also found that the experience of quasi-public dispute
resolution organizations, private organizations, and states demonstrated the
value of collecting and publishing arbitration-related information, suggested
specific information that would benefit from disclosure, and evidenced a
developing trend toward transparency. The Section acknowledged that
some dispute resolution professionals and organizations had raised
legitimate concerns regarding the costs of complying with the CFPB’s
Arbitration Reporting Requirement37 and the potential loss of
confidentiality for processes that many describe as “private” dispute
resolution. Nonetheless, the Section urged that transparency was essential
to protect the integrity of arbitration and that:
[the] reporting and publication proposed by the CFPB—and the
consequent availability of the information for those participating
in consumer arbitration, those researching consumer arbitration,
and those overseeing consumer arbitration—will help to protect
the integrity of arbitration and, by extension, the integrity of the

35. Id.
36. CFPB REPORT, supra note 10, § 5.1, at 5-6 (observing that most state and federal
courts also do not require reporting regarding settlements).
37. See, e.g., Letter from Nessa Feddis, Vice President & Senior Counsel, Ctr. for
Regulatory Compliance, Am. Bankers Ass’n; Steven I. Zeisel, Exec. Vice President & Gen.
Counsel, Consumer Bankers Ass’n; and K. Richard Foster, Senior Vice President & Senior
Counsel for Regulatory & Legal Affairs, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, to Richard Cordray, Dir.,
CFPB (Aug. 22, 2016).
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strong federal policy in favor of arbitration that has been
expressed by the Supreme Court.38
The Section then specifically identified the use of arbitration at issue here
and explained the factors that demanded modification of the usual
understanding of arbitration as a “creature of contract” that could and
should be entirely private.
[T]ransparency is particularly important when, as here, one of
the parties to a dispute is imposing a dispute resolution process
upon the other party and the courts may be asked to enforce—
and thus lend their coercive power and legitimacy to—the award
produced by the process.39
In sum, the Section strongly supported the CFPB’s proposal to require
regulated entities to submit arbitration claim filings, awards, and other
documents to the CFPB, and to publish such information. The Section also
urged the CFPB to consider how quasi-public and private organizations had
structured their databases to ensure easy access, searchability, and an
overall sense of the dispute resolution system and its outcomes. The Section
was particularly struck by those organizations that provided for both an
online searchable database of individual awards and useful aggregated data
(including data regarding mediation and different types of arbitral panels).
The Section also proposed a few modifications, based on the importance
of assuring parties and the public that “individual arbitrators and dispute
resolution providers offer an effective and impartial forum.”40 Regarding
impartiality, the Section advocated for a searchable database of claim
filings and awards that would reveal the number of times that a regulated
entity had been a party in an arbitration filed with or administered by a
particular dispute resolution provider, the number of times that a regulated
entity’s arbitration had been conducted by a particular arbitrator, and the
number of times that particular lawyers had represented clients in such
arbitrations and before particular arbitrators. Thus, a searchable database
would reveal repeat players of various types and potential conflicts of
38. Welsh, Comment Letter, supra note 27, at 2. Notably, defenders of arbitration have
also remarked upon “the need for more thorough empirical research into the dynamics of
arbitration specifically and the resolution of disputes more generally.” Peter B. Rutledge,
Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 281 (2008).
39. Welsh, Comment Letter, supra note 27, at 8.
40. Id.
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interest. The database proposed by the CFPB did not, however, include
information regarding “prior mediation experience with a particular dispute
resolution organization or neutral, or the financial interests that might exist
among dispute resolution organizations, parties, and legal
representatives.”41 The Section urged the CFPB to require disclosure
regarding such prior experience and relationships to further assist with
protecting the impartiality, effectiveness, and integrity of arbitration, and
recommended considering the experience of the states in requiring
disclosures regarding prior mediations42 and financial interests that might
represent conflicts of interest. Finally, the Section urged the CFPB to
consider specifying the mechanisms it would use to enforce its reporting
requirements.
The election of Donald Trump as President in November 2016
apparently scuttled any chance that the CFPB’s proposed rules would be
made effective.43 Nonetheless, on July 10, 2017, the CFPB announced its
new rule barring mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses that
included class action waivers and requiring the reporting of arbitration
claim filings, pre-dispute arbitration agreements, awards, and
communications regarding compliance with fairness principles and
payment requirements.44 The rule also provided for making such
information public after appropriate aggregation or redaction.45
There were only a few differences between the Arbitration Reporting
Proposal and the final rule announced in July 2017. Most notably, the
CFPB had added two more reporting requirements. Providers of financial
services and goods would be required to submit the answer to any initial
claim or counterclaim and, “[i]n connection with any case in court by or
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative
Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 19, 34 n.71 (1999)
(“Beyond the use of one ADR firm as a repeat provider, this law firm represented to me that
a single mediator had been used over 300 times in one year! The repeat play law firm (by
specialty) was able to maximize its use of a single repeat play mediator. So far, neither ethics
regulations nor other rules require the law firm or the mediator to disclose to one-shot
litigants that he had performed for this firm before.”).
43. See Welsh, Class Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration
Clauses, supra note 6, at 431 (expressing doubts regarding the likelihood that the CFPB
would announce final rules).
44. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210, 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).
45. Id.
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against the provider . . . [a]ny submission to a court that relies on a predispute arbitration agreement in support of [an] attempt to seek dismissal,
deferral, or stay . . . and [t]he pre-dispute arbitration agreement [itself].”46
The final rule also provided for the CFPB’s posting of the redacted records
(with possible additional redactions by the CFPB) on a publicly available
website that the CFPB would establish and maintain, with easy access and
retrieval functions.
Opponents quickly mounted legal47 and legislative48 challenges. Before
the end of July 2017, the House of Representatives voted to nullify the
CFPB’s new rule.49 On October 24, with a tie-breaking vote cast by Vice
President Pence, the U.S. Senate joined the House.50 On November 1,
President Trump signed the repeal of the CFPB’s rule.51
A surprisingly broad swath of the media covered the Senate’s and the
President’s action nullifying the CFPB’s final rule.52 As before, though,
almost no attention was paid to the reporting provisions in the rule. Few
46. Id. at 33,430.
47. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Chamber of Commerce v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 3:17-cv-02670-D (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017).
48. See Lisa Lambert, House Votes to Kill Consumer Lawsuit Rule, REUTERS (July 25,
2017, 5:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-arbitration/house-votes-tokill-consumer-lawsuit-rule-idUSKBN1AA2SI.
49. Id.
50. See Gillian B. White, Congress’s Late-Night Vote to Protect Banks from Lawsuits,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/cfpbmandatory-arbitration/543918/ (noting opposition to the CFPB rule from the Treasury
Department “headed by the former Goldman Sachs banker Steve Mnuchin” and the “Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, currently led by the one-time Wells Fargo defense
attorney Keith Noreika”).
51. See Sylvan Lane, Trump Repeals Consumer Arbitration Rule, Wins Banker Praise,
HILL (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:43 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/358297-trump-repealsconsumer-bureau-arbitration-rule-joined-by-heads-of-banking.
52. See, e.g., Chris Arnold, Senate Kills Rule on Class-Action Lawsuits Against
Financial Firms, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 25, 2017, 4:43 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/
2017/10/25/560089065/senate-kills-rule-on-class-action-lawsuits-against-financial-firms;
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action Suits,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/senate-votewall-street-regulation.html; Megan Leonhardt, Lawmakers Just Made It Nearly Impossible
for You to Sue Companies Like Equifax and Wells Fargo, MONEY (Oct. 25, 2017),
http://time.com/money/4996613/senate-kills-cfpb-arbitration-rules/; Jim Spencer, ClassAction Rule’s Defeat Came Despite Widespread Appeal, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Oct. 28,
2017, 12:28 AM), http://www.startribune.com/class-action-rule-s-defeat-came-despitewidespread-appeal/453692293/.
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noticed when the CFPB first proposed to require reporting. Few noticed
when the CFPB announced its reporting requirements. Few noticed when
the reporting requirements were repealed. Regardless, by the end of this
saga, the opportunity to bring some measure of transparency to mandatory
pre-dispute consumer arbitration was dead.
Why, at this point, should anyone care?
II. The Experience of Federal and State Courts with the Collection and
Publication of Information Regarding Civil Litigation
Professor Judith Resnik has observed recently that judges regularly
“posit that openness supports informed discussions of government, fosters
perceptions of fairness, checks corruption, enhances performance,
facilitates accountability, discourages fraud, and permits communities to
vent emotions.”53 Perhaps the courts’ appreciation of the benefits of
openness, particularly in a democracy, helps to explain federal and state
courts’ general history of ensuring access to information regarding their
operations.54
Of course, court filings have long been presumed to be accessible to the
public. As a result, information regarding the claims in individual cases,
relief sought, counterclaims, defenses, parties, lawyers, and court
judgments have been available to those willing to undertake the effort and
time required to travel to individual courthouses and page through court
files.55 Access to federal filings became much easier in 1990 with the
creation of PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records), an online
system maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.56
Access is not free, however,57 which has placed limits on the availability of
53. Resnik, The Contingency of Openness, supra note 2, at 1671-72.
54. See id. at 1636 (“Judges gain legitimacy from being embedded in public
exchanges.”); Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big
Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1355-57 (2015) (tracing transparency of the courts back to
Medieval Europe and Colonial America).
55. See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical
Study, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1817-18 (2015); see also Elizabeth Figueroa,
Transparency in Administrative Courts: From the Outside Looking In, 35 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 36-37 (2015) (regarding administrative courts).
56. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 54, at 1357-59.
57. The cost is ten cents per page, with a thirty-page cap on such costs for documents
and case-specific reports. This cap does not apply to other searches. See Frequently Asked
Questions, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/psc/faq.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2018); see
also Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 54, at 1359-62 (regarding complaints about pay wall,
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this resource for empirical research.58 In addition, as Peter Rutledge has
observed, “the litigation system is not always bathed in sunshine—
protective orders, closed proceedings, filings under seal, and settlements all
reduce the degree of public scrutiny of the system.”59
Both federal and state courts make aggregate information available
regarding their operations. Interestingly, the Attorney General of the United
States was responsible for the first publication of statistical tables regarding
the federal courts in 1871.60 Today, the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts produces and publishes annual reports that discuss the federal courts
generally, with separate sections devoted to component parts of the federal
judiciary. The reports provide aggregate numbers regarding complaints
against judges and their disposition.61 They also highlight and explain
unusual increases or declines in civil filings or dispositions.62 These
free-access pilot program, subsequent hacking of PACER, and creation of web application,
RECAP, which saves duplicates of downloaded documents). Recently, Congressman Greg
Collins introduced the Electronic Court Records Reform Act (H.R. 6714, 115th Cong.
(2018)), which would require documents downloaded from the PACER database to be free.
See Jason Tashea, Proposed Legislation Would Eliminate PACER Fees, ABA J. (Sept. 18,
2018, 10:55 AM CDT), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_bill_wants_to_end_
pacer_fees.
58. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Court-System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 537
(2009) (urging that federal courts should require the use of data-enabled PDF forms)
(“Policymakers, litigants, and the public could see the amounts of damages granted in
personal-injury cases, the lengths of criminal sentences, the likelihood of success on various
kinds of motions, the differences in outcomes among courts, the relative effectiveness of
lawyers and expert witnesses, and the answers to a myriad of other questions.”); see also
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 54, at 1359-60.
59. Rutledge, supra note 38, at 276-77 (urging that “the virtues of confidentiality at
least counterbalance some of the loss of transparency”); see also Michael Kagan, Rebecca
Gill & Fatma Marouf, Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J.
683, 685-86 (2018) (reporting results of empirical research showing that many federal circuit
court decisions on immigration appeals are unavailable and essentially invisible to the
public).
60. See Resnik, A2J, supra note 2, at 627 (citing PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91-95 (1973); David S. Clark, Adjudication to
Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 97 (1981)).
61. See, e.g., Judicial Business 2016, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/judicial-business-2016 (last visited Nov. 27, 2018).
62. See, e.g., U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2017, U.S. CTS., http://www.
uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2017 (last visited Nov. 27,
2018) (explaining significant increases or drops in case numbers, and regional variations,
due to claims arising out of foreclosures, purchases of genetically modified corn seeds from
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explanations alert interested parties to trends throughout the federal courts
or in particular jurisdictions. Twice each year, the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts also publishes the most frequently requested tables of
statistics regarding the workload of the federal courts. These tables contain
aggregate data regarding a variety of information: numbers of cases filed,
terminated, and pending by jurisdiction; numbers of cases filed by
jurisdiction, nature of suit, and district; numbers of cases terminated, by
nature of suit and action taken; and median time from filing to disposition
of civil cases, by action taken.63 Both the annual reports and the semiannual tables of statistics are available online at no cost.
These reports and statistical tables are not perfect. Concerns have been
raised regarding the accuracy and consistency of the data input by court
clerks.64 In addition, there are some notable exclusions in the data captured
for aggregation and publication. For example, while the reports and tables
reveal the occurrence of dispositions, they do not provide information
regarding the terms of such dispositions. Further, while the reports and
tables show the number of civil cases terminated during a twelve-month
period and provide some breakdowns regarding the actions taken that
resulted in termination,65 such breakdowns are extremely limited. For
example, there is no information regarding the number of terminations
resulting from judicial settlement conferences, mediation, other facilitated
settlement procedures, or traditional bilateral negotiations between the
lawyers.66 Notably, a few district courts have taken the initiative to provide
Syngenta AG, Deepwater Horizon’s oil spill, and use of pelvic repair products, the
cholesterol drug Lipitor, and Skechers Toning Shoe Products).
63. See Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary—June 2016, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary-june-2016 (last
visited Nov. 27, 2018).
64. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis
of Beliefs About the Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better Data About
Law, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 137, 156 (2006); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials
Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 722 (2004).
65. The tables indicate how many civil cases are terminated with no court action and
with court action occurring before trial, during or after pretrial, during or after a non-jury
trial, and during or after a jury trial. See, e.g., Table C-4—U.S. District Courts—Civil
Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2017), http://www.uscourts.
gov/statistics/table/c-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2017/12/31.
66. Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement and Procedural Justice, 16 NEV.
L.J. 983, 1044-45 (2016) (“While much is reported about magistrate judges’ functions, much
more is unknown—e.g., how many dispositions actually result from magistrate judges’
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aggregated information regarding their use of mediation and other ADR
procedures.67 Other district courts have developed their own jurisdictionspecific settlement databases. Federal magistrate judges facilitating
settlement conferences then use these databases with parties to allow
comparisons with settlements reached in similar matters.68 These databases
are not made available to the public generally.
State courts also publish aggregate information regarding their
operations. For civil caseloads, state courts tend to report the number of
filings and dispositions, often indicating whether the dispositions were the
result of defaults, jury trials, or bench trials.69 However, only a few state
settlement sessions, how many cases go to mediation, how often magistrate judges serve as
mediators, how many dispositions result from mediation and other settlement procedures,
and the terms of these dispositions.”).
67. See, e.g., REBECCA PRICE, U.S. DIST. COURT S. DIST. OF N.Y., MEDIATION PROGRAM:
ANNUAL REPORT JANUARY 1, 2016 – DECEMBER 31, 2016 (Dec. 5, 2017); U.S. DIST. COURT
OF THE N. DIST. OF CAL., ADR PROGRAM REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 (OCTOBER 1, 2016
THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2017); U.S. DIST. COURT OF THE CENT. DIST. OF CAL., ADR
PROGRAM REPORT – CALENDAR YEAR 2016; see also Wayne Brazil, Informalism and
Formalism in the History of ADR in the United States and An Exploration of the Sources,
Character, and Implications of Formalism in a Court-sponsored ADR Programme, in
FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 250, 303-04, 317, 330-332
(Joachim Zekoll et al. eds., 2014) (using data gathered by District Court staff to discuss party
perceptions of mediator interventions and fairness, as well as parties’ or their attorneys’
preference for mediation).
68. See Morton Denlow, Magistrate Judges’ Important Role in Settling Cases, 61 FED.
LAW. 103, 103 (2014); John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the
Courts’ Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and
Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 235–36 (citing
Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement Databases: Development and
Uses, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2004, at 19, 19-21 (writing about settlement databases)).
69. See, e.g., MD. CTS., MARYLAND JUDICIARY STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2017 (2018),
https://www.courts.state.md.us/sites/default/files/import/publications/annualreport/reports/20
17/fy2017statisticalabstract.pdf (providing number of civil cases filed and terminated; no
detail regarding the manner of disposition); Summary Reporting System, FLA. CTS.,
http://trialstats.flcourts.org/TrialCourtStats/ReportTrialCourtStats (last visited Oct. 25, 2018)
(showing that Circuit Civil cases’ disposition types include: dismissed before hearing;
dismissed after hearing; disposed by default; disposed by judge; disposed by non-jury trial;
disposed by jury trial; and other); OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., TEX. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 22, 23, 46
(2018), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1441398/ar-fy-17-final.pdf (providing information
regarding filings and dispositions for civil cases as a result of: dismissal by plaintiff, default
judgment, agreed judgment, bench trial, dismissal for want of prosecution, all other
dispositions, summary judgment, jury/directed verdict); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CAL.
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courts provide more detailed aggregate numbers regarding the dispositions
resulting from the use of dispute resolution processes, such as courtconnected mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, or judicial
settlement conferences.70
Significantly, federal and state courts are not alone in providing access to
filings and aggregate information. Increasingly, quasi-public and “private”
dispute resolution procedures are also subject to some degree of
transparency.
III. The Experience of Quasi-Public and Private Organizations, States, and
Users with the Collection and Publication of Information Regarding
Dispute Resolution
The experience of quasi-public arbitration programs, private dispute
resolution organizations, states and users with the collection and publication
of data regarding arbitration proceedings (and to a much lesser degree,
mediation sessions) is also instructive. The transparency and accountability
offered by such reporting and publication have helped to promote the
integrity of the dispute resolution processes.
A few examples follow regarding quasi-public and private arbitration
programs’ provision for the transparency and accountability of their
processes and outcomes by making their awards available and searchable
online, much as proposed by the CFPB and supported by the Section. These
are followed by examples of states’ disclosure requirements, users’ “selfhelp” initiatives, and calls for ODR to provide for transparency.

COURTS, 2017 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS: 2006–2007
THROUGH 2015–2016, at 95-98 (2017), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2017-CourtStatistics-Report.pdf (listing dispositions for delay of prosecution, through other means, after
a jury trial or after a bench trial).
70. See, e.g., Uniform Data Reporting, Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs: Cases
Ordered July through September 2017, FLA. CTS. (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.flcourts.org/
core/fileparse.php/541/urlt/Alternative-Dispute-Resolution-Program-Jul-Sep17.pdf (“This
data is reported by court administration through the Uniform Data Reporting system web
application and is not audited. In addition, data may be amended at a later date.”). But see
Resnik, The Contingency of Openness, supra note 2, at 1667-68 (reporting that in Illinois,
court-connected arbitration includes a public dimension and that outcomes are in a court
database).
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A. FINRA: Required Publication of Awards and Other Aggregate Data71
The rules of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), a
not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress, require its awards to be
made publicly available.72 The awards are online and searchable through
the FINRA Arbitration Awards Online database,73 as well as commercial
databases, such as Westlaw. The FINRA database is available without
charge, and users can access FINRA arbitration awards from January 1989
through the present. In addition, users can access the awards of all
arbitration programs absorbed over the years by FINRA (which include the
American Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, International
Stock Exchange, Philadelphia Stock Exchange, and Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board) and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) (which
includes Pacific Exchange/NYSE ARCA).
The database provides users with instantaneous access to awards and the
ability to search for awards by using multiple criteria, such as by case
number, keywords within awards, arbitrator names, party names, date
ranges set by the user, and any combination of these features. FINRA also
now includes information about the panel selection method and panel
composition.
In addition, FINRA publishes various statistics online:
! The number of cases filed and closed thus far during the current
year
! Historical statistics for cases filed and closed
! The top fifteen controversy types in customer arbitrations
! The top fifteen security types in customer arbitrations
! The top fifteen controversy types in intra-industry arbitrations
71. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s
Dispute Resolution Activities 21 (rev. Apr. 16, 2018) (part of 2018 FINRA Annual
Conference materials).
72. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL r. 12904(h) (2018),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192
[hereinafter FINRA MANUAL] (“All awards shall be made publicly available.”); Arbitration
Process: Decision and Award, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/decision-award (last visited Dec. 7, 2018) (“FINRA makes all arbitration awards
publicly available for free by posting them on Arbitration Awards Online.”).
73. See FINRA Arbitration Awards Online, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/arbitrationand-mediation/arbitration-awards (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
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! How arbitration cases close (e.g., after arbitration hearing, after
arbitrators’ review of documents, direct settlement by parties,
settled via mediation,74 withdrawn, all others)
! Results of customer claimant arbitration award cases (e.g.,
percentage of all customer claimant cases closed that were
decided by arbitrators, percentage (and number) of cases where
customer awarded damages)
! Results of all-public panels and majority-public panels in
customer cases
! Arbitrators by type and location
! Mediation statistics thus far during the current year.75
The resulting disclosures have helped to protect the integrity of the
arbitration process by providing parties with information they need to
prepare for arbitrations and, more broadly, enabling important empirical
research and systemic analysis that otherwise would not be possible.76
These disclosures also have permitted regulators and observers to become
aware of potentially worrisome trends in the financial services industry.
FINRA has continued to examine its procedures to enhance their
transparency and legitimacy. Since 2009, for example, FINRA has required
its arbitrators to issue an explained award—defined as “a fact-based award
stating the general reason(s) for the arbitrators’ decision”—if all parties to
the dispute jointly request one.77 Few parties have jointly requested an
explained award since the rule’s enactment. In response, the FINRA
Dispute Resolution Task Force recommended that FINRA change its rule to
require an explained decision unless any party notifies the panel before the
initial pre-hearing conference that it is opting out of such requirement.78
74. FINRA also offers mediation. See Mediation Overview, FINRA, https://www.finra.
org/arbitration-and-mediation/mediation-overview (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
75. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-andmediation/dispute-resolution-statistics (last visited Dec. 7, 2018).
76. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Theodore Eisenberg, Punitive Damages in Securities
Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 497 (2010).
77. See FINRA MANUAL, supra note 72, at r. 12904(g)(2), http://finra.complinet.com/
en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192.
78. See FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 20-23 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Final-DR-taskforce-report.pdf.
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The Task Force noted that it believed “increased confidence in the fairness
of the system would likely flow from th[e] increased transparency.”79
B. ICANN: Required Publication of Awards
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”),
a not-for-profit public benefit corporation, similarly requires its approved
dispute resolution service providers to make Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) decisions publicly available online,80
thus providing the public, parties, and arbitrators with easy access to
arbitrators’ decisions and their reasoning.81 Publication of neutrals’
decisions is understood as necessary to enhance the legitimacy and
predictability82 of the system. One of the dominant providers, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), has also established a system
for querying its database regarding particular issues or categories of cases. 83
As a result of the required publication of decisions, the ICANN system has
permitted patterns of decision-making and institutions’ repeat appointments
of arbitrators to be highlighted. Such transparency has assisted the integrity
of the dispute resolution system.84
79. Id. at 21.
80. See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”),
ICANN r. 16(b)), https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en (last
visited on Dec. 11, 2018) (“Except if the Panel determines otherwise [per Paragraph 4(j) of
the Policy, ‘when an Administrative Panel determines in an exceptional case to redact
portions of its decision’], the Provider shall publish the full decision and the date of its
implementation on a publicly accessible web site. In any event, the portion of any decision
determining a complaint to have been brought in bad faith (see Paragraph 15(e) of these
Rules) shall be published.”).
81. See List of Approved Dispute Resolution Service Providers, ICANN,
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/providers-6d-2012-02-25-en (last visited Nov. 28,
2018) (listing approved dispute resolution service providers, including links to their
databases of proceedings and decisions).
82. See World Intellectual Prop. Org., FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN
NAME PROCESS ¶ 219 (1999).
83. See Ethan Katsh & Colin Rule, What We Know and Need to Know About Online
Dispute Resolution, 67 S.C. L. REV. 329, 336-37 (2016) (noting that the other major
provider, National Arbitration Forum, enables only a full-text search of its decisions, and it
is necessary to access a third party in order to conduct a full-text search of the decisions of
both WIPO and NAM).
84. See Benjamin G. Davis, The New New Thing: Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 3 J. World
Intell. Prop. 525, 532 (2000) (updated version); Benjamin G. Davis, The New New Thing:
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy of the Internet Corporation for Assigned
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C. International Arbitration: Required and Increased Voluntary
Publication of Awards
International dispute resolution providers regularly make information
public regarding their proceedings and awards. The World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), for example, provides a searchable, online database
of trade disputes brought to the WTO for resolution pursuant to the Dispute
Settlement Understanding.85 The awards are public, while pleadings are
public only at the election of nations.86 In the investor-state arbitration
Names and Numbers, 17 J. INT’L ARB., no. 3, 2000, at 115, 115-17, 122; Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy2012-02-25-en (last visited Nov. 28, 2018); Benjamin G. Davis, Une Magouille Planetaire:
The UDRP Is an International Scam: An Independent Assessment of the Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, 72 MISS. L.J. 815 (2002); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 241, 298 (2016) (reporting that “[a]nalysis of arbitrator selection showed that
among dominant providers [NAF and WIPO], arbitrators who decided most often in favor of
the complainant received more cases, while persons with reputations for decisions protective
of domain name owners were seldom if ever selected as sole arbitrators” and were instead
“placed on [relatively rarely used] three-person panels”; also observing, based on subsequent
research, that “the system improved over time”) (citing Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An
Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 903, 928-30 (2002); 2012 Domain Dispute Study, DNATTORNEY.COM (Aug. 28,
2012), https://dnattorney.com/resources/case-studies/); Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policies, ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/dndr-2012-02-25-en (last visited
Nov. 28, 2018) (providing other domain name dispute resolution policies). Recently, Amy
Schmitz and Colin Rule have pointed out the importance of ICANN’s transparency:
Transparency helps to ensure that an ODR system is operating the way that it
should. ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Protocol (UDRP)
is an excellent example of a transparent online dispute resolution process (even
though it may have challenges in some of the other ethical standards). Under
the UDRP, every case filing and decision is publicly accessible. This has led to
quite a bit of external scrutiny for the UDRP process. As one may expect, it is
not necessarily comfortable for the participants and the dispute resolution
service providers to have full public scrutiny for all cases coming through the
system. However, transparency can be a very important way for ODR systems
to retain public trust, and for problems to be detected quickly and resolved.
Much like how sunlight laws in the public sector promote honesty, process
transparency in ODR is key to combating systemic bias.
AMY SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 76 (2017).
85. See Dispute Settlement Archive, World Trade Org., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#disputes (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
86. For example, the United States makes its pleadings available. Id.
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context, the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”) currently offers an online, searchable list of cases and arbitral
awards.87 ICSID only publishes awards with the consent of the parties.
However, even without the parties’ consent, ICSID publishes excerpts of
arbitral panels’ legal reasoning.88 This information has been useful for the
parties directly involved in investor-state disputes and for those conducting
systemic, empirical analysis.89
Indeed, in the investor-state context, substantial attention has been paid
to the need for transparency. For example, the United Nations Rules on
Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, which became
effective on April 1, 2014, provide for the publication of documents, open
hearings, and the opportunity for interested third parties to file and make
submissions.90 For disputes arising out of treaties concluded before April 1,
2014, these rules regarding transparency apply only at the election of the
parties to the arbitration or the parties to the relevant treaty.91

87. See ICSID Award Database, World Bank, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/
cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx. (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
88. See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION,
REGULATIONS AND RULES Arbitration Rule 48(4), at 122 (Apr. 2006), https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/documents/icsiddocs/icsid%20convention%20english.pdf (“The Centre
shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however,
promptly include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.”).
89. See, e.g., Daniel Behn, Legitimacy, Evolution, and Growth in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: Empirically Evaluating the State-of-the-Art, 46 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 363 (2015);
Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007); Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J. 459 (2015).
90. UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL RULES ON
TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION art. 3, 4 (2014), http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html; see also
Deborah R. Hensler, The Private in Public, the Public in Private: The Blurring Boundary
Between Public and Private Dispute Resolution, in FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION IN
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 67, at 45, 63-65 (discussing the controversy over
transparency).
91. See generally U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION [THE “MAURITIUS
CONVENTION ON TRANSPARENCY”] (2014), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/transparency-convention/Transparency-Convention-e.pdf. See also James Hope,
Transparency in International Arbitration, CDR: COM. DISP. RESOL. (May 11, 2016),
https://www.cdr-news.com/categories/expert-views/6376-transparency-in-internationalarbitration (describing the application of the United Nations Commission on International
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Even though international commercial arbitration awards are not
required to be published, there are indications that such awards and
aggregated information are being published voluntarily with greater
frequency. In the past, only a selective group of lawyers and law firms was
likely to know about and use international commercial arbitrators’
decisions. Now, however, international commercial arbitral institutions are
advocating increased publication, “with some institutions even shifting to a
presumption in favor of redacted awards in the absence of party
objection.”92 Legal journals, such as the Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards,
publish arbitral awards with the redaction of names and other identifying
information.93 As a result of shifting presumptions regarding the publication
of awards, some commentators perceive an increasingly transparent body of
non-binding but persuasive precedent being produced by international
commercial arbitration.94 Other commentators acknowledge a trend toward
transparency (especially in the investor-state arbitration context as
described above), but they also note that “most if not all” international
commercial arbitral institutions continue to publish only selected awards
and then only in redacted form, and that such awards “are not always easy
to search or find.”95 Indeed, access to such awards is generally available
only by subscription.
Meanwhile, online subscription services now exist that use aggregated
data regarding international commercial mediation and arbitration
contributed by dispute resolution organizations from around the world (and
involving data from 185 nations) to generate up-to-date geographic and
case-type reports on “average claim amounts by case type, average claim
amount versus amount awarded, arbitration and/or settlement outcomes by
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency, Mauritius Convention on Transparency,
and the UNCITRAL Transparency Registry).
92. Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54
Univ. Kan. L. Rev. 1301, 1319-20 (2006); see also Cases, PERMANENT CT. OF ARB.,
https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2018) (providing public information
regarding cases at parties’ election).
93. See Christian Duve & Jill I. Gross, Commercial Arbitration: Germany and the
United States, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2017, at 15, 18 (citing Berger, SchiedsVZ 2009, 289,
296).
94. See Rogers, supra note 92, at 1319-20.
95. Ank Santens & Romain Zamour, Dreaded Dearth of Precedent in the Wake of
International Arbitration: Could the Cause Also Bring the Cure?, 7 Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 73, 78 (2015) (citing S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial
Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. REV. OF ARB. 119 (2009)).
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case type, whether parties frequently file counterclaims and their success
rates, and the average length of case.”96 Subscribers also can learn about
“the frequency of the use of discovery tools, including e-discovery, and the
success rate of counterclaims by case type.”97 Access to these aggregated
data regarding international commercial arbitration and mediation requires
payment of a fee.
D. Labor Arbitration: Required and Voluntary Publication of Awards
Labor arbitration provides another model for the publication of
information regarding arbitrations and their results.98 Many state providers
of labor arbitration make their awards available online.99 Some states also
make public the results of grievance arbitrations with public sector
unions.100

96. Q&A with Bill Slate, Chairman, CEO and Co-founder of Dispute Resolution Data,
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Oct. 2017), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/
publications/157150/data-insights; see also International Commercial Arbitration and
Mediation:
What
Does
the
Data
Show?,
DISP.
RESOL.
DATA,
http://www.disputeresolutiondata.com/international_commercial_arbitration (last visited
Dec. 11, 2018) [hereinafter What Does the Data Show?] (“[D]ispute Resolution
Data (DRD) is receiving data from 17 international entities and then aggregating the data by
case type (28 different) and seven geographic regions. In this process, each closed
international commercial arbitration provides information for up to 100 data fields and each
closed international mediation up to 45 data fields. Presently, over 1,000 cases have
provided information, in excess of, 40,000 data fields.”).
97. What Does the Data Show?, supra note 96.
98. In contrast, this sort of information is not generally available for employment
arbitration. See David B. Lipsky, J. Ryan Lamare & Michael D. Maffie, Mandatory
Employment Arbitration: Dispelling the Myths, 32 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 133,
142 (2014) (critiquing claims regarding expansive use of mandatory pre-dispute employment
arbitration clauses but also acknowledging “that no institution or individual has ever been
able to collect a comprehensive set of data on the total number of employment arbitration
claims”). But see text at infra notes 103-04 (regarding AAA disclosures, including
disclosures regarding employment arbitration conducted pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses).
99. See, e.g., Arbitration Awards, St. of Minn. Bureau of Mediation Serv.,
http://mn.gov/admin/bms/arbitration/awards/; (last visited Nov. 28, 2018); Interest
Arbitration Awards, WASH. ST. PUB. EMP. RELATIONS COMM’N, https://decisions.perc.wa.
gov/waperc/interest-arbritations/en/nav_date.do (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
100. See, e.g., Grievance Arbitration Decisions, WASH. OFF. OF FIN. MGMT.,
http://www.ofm.wa.gov/labor/arbitration/grievance/decisions.asp (last visited Nov. 28,
2018).
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In other settings, labor arbitration awards are not required to be
published. However, those that are published are generally accompanied by
reasoned opinions that provide parties with valuable information.101 Parties
can access searchable online databases of these labor arbitration awards
through various private providers (e.g., Bloomberg BNA, CCH, and
Thomson West’s LAIS). Bloomberg BNA’s Arbitration Award Navigator,
for example, allows users to access a collection of at least 20,000 arbitration
awards to assess trends, evaluate arbitrators, and pinpoint awards. Users can
search awards by case name, arbitrator, topic, union, employer, industry,
classification outline number, and several other criteria. These sources are
non-public and require payment.
E. Consumer Arbitration in California, District of Columbia, Maine, and
Maryland: Required Disclosures
There is also substantial state (and District of Columbia) experience with
the required submission and publication of data, specifically regarding
consumer arbitration. Again, such disclosures have enabled vital empirical
research and systemic analysis.102

101. The benefits of arbitrator opinion writing are many and varied. See Sarah R. Cole,
The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271,
280. First, opinion writing improves the quality of arbitral decision-making. The process of
writing an opinion encourages the arbitrator to carefully consider her decision. In addition,
opinion writing assists parties in selecting an arbitrator because it provides them with better
information about a particular arbitrator's decision-making process and potential biases. The
opinion-writing requirement also improves the hearing process (because the arbitrator will
need to make sure he or she understands all of the issues presented) and provides a greater
sense of resolution to the parties, who will now have a deeper understanding of the reasons
they won or lost. Moreover, this relatively inexpensive process change would have a
significant impact on parties' and the public's perception of arbitration as a fair and
legitimate forum for the resolution of disputes. See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Writing,
Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Functions, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283 (2008).
102. See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 407 (2007). The
AAA has been most conscientious in complying with California’s disclosure requirements.
Access to the AAA data first indicated both the presence of a “repeat player” effect in
employment arbitration and the improvement in employees’ success rates after the AAA
began enforcing the Employment Due Process Protocol. See Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon
Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence
that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT ARENA 303, 303 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004).
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Unlike the quasi-public and private organizations described supra, the
states have not provided for the disclosure and publication of awards.
Instead, they have required dispute resolution providers to collect and
disclose specific pieces of information. In some respects, the resulting data
provides less information than would be available from a review of
arbitration filings and awards; in other respects, the resulting data exceeds
what would be available from such a review.
California is the leader in requiring disclosures regarding consumer
arbitration. Effective January 1, 2003, California Civil Procedure Code
section 1281.96 began requiring dispute resolution providers to collect,
publish at least quarterly,103 and make available to the public on the
provider’s website (and on paper upon request) a report containing
information about the provider’s consumer arbitrations within the preceding
five years.104 The statute also requires the report’s format to be searchable
and sortable by members of the public using “readily available software”
and “to be directly accessible from a conspicuously displayed link” that is
identified as “consumer case information.”105
The statute, which was amended in 2014, currently requires publication
of the following pieces of information:
(1) Whether arbitration was demanded pursuant to a predispute arbitration clause and, if so, whether the pre-dispute
arbitration clause designated the administering private arbitration
company.
(2) The name of the nonconsumer party, if the nonconsumer
party is a corporation or other business entity, and whether the
nonconsumer party was the initiating party or the responding
party, if known.
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2016). Certain providers that handle
fewer than 50 consumer arbitrations are required to report only semiannually. Id. §
1281.96(c)(2).
104. Id. § 1281.96(a). See generally Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics—Is California the
Future?, 18 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 343, 347 (2003); Ruth V. Glick, California Arbitration
Reform: The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 119, 122 (2003); Richard Chernick, ImposedArbitration Reforms Threaten to Stifle Strengths of Commercial Arbitration, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Fall 2002, at 16; Jay Folberg, Arbitration Ethics: Winds of Reform Blowing from the
West?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 5 (describing reasons underlying establishment of
new disclosure requirements for arbitrators in California); Gail Hillebrand, Should
California’s Ethics Rules Be Adopted Nationwide?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2002, at 10.
105. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(b) (West 2016).
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(3) The nature of the dispute involved as one of the following:
goods; credit; other banking or finance; insurance; health care;
construction; real estate; telecommunications, including software
and Internet usage; debt collection; personal injury;
employment106; or other. . . .
(4) Whether the consumer or nonconsumer party was the
prevailing party. As used in this section, “prevailing party”
includes the party with a net monetary recovery or an award of
injunctive relief.
(5) The total number of occasions, if any, the nonconsumer
party has previously been a party in an arbitration administered
by the private arbitration company.
(6) The total number of occasions, if any, the nonconsumer
party has previously been a party in a mediation administered by
the private arbitration company.
(7) Whether the consumer party was represented by an
attorney and, if so, the name of the attorney and the full name of
the law firm that employs the attorney, if any.
(8) The date the private arbitration company received the
demand for arbitration, the date the arbitrator was appointed, and
the date of disposition by the arbitrator or private arbitration
company.
(9) The type of disposition of the dispute, if known, identified
as one of the following: withdrawal, abandonment, settlement,
award after hearing, award without hearing, default, or dismissal
without hearing. If a case was administered in a hearing, indicate
whether the hearing was conducted in person, by telephone or
video conference, or by documents only.
(10) The amount of the claim, whether equitable relief was
requested or awarded, the amount of any monetary award, the
amount of any attorney's fees awarded, and any other relief
granted, if any.
106. California is unique in including the arbitration of employment matters within a
statute structured to focus on consumer arbitration. The Section was careful to take no
position on this inclusion.
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(11) The name of the arbitrator, his or her total fee for the
case, the percentage of the arbitrator's fee allocated to each party,
whether a waiver of any fees was granted, and, if so, the amount
of the waiver.107
It is particularly notable that California’s statute requires disclosure of a
non-consumer’s prior mediation experience with a dispute resolution
provider, as well as prior arbitration experience.108 Meanwhile, the statute
does not require disclosure of the name of the consumer, the specific legal
claims involved, the basis for an arbitral award, or the terms of any
settlement. The statute also does not provide for any mechanism to enforce
its requirements.109
Some commentators and scholars report that despite the value of the
information disclosed pursuant to California’s requirements, many dispute
resolution providers are not in compliance.110 The AAA has been
particularly conscientious in complying with the state’s requirements. The
AAA displays the relevant data quite prominently on its website, discloses
information about the statutes that require provision of the data, provides
guidance on how to search the database,111 and, as noted supra, cooperated
with the CFPB in furnishing data for the study required by the Dodd-Frank
Act. Recently, however, Professor Judith Resnik reported deficiencies in
even the AAA’s disclosures112 and concluded that the available information
107. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West 2016).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Resnik, A2J, supra note 2, at 648 (observing that a 2017 study reported that of
the 32 entities offering consumer arbitration, only about one third (eleven) posted the data
and one tenth (three) met all the California requirements); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra
note 6, at 2898 (citing DAVID J. JUNG, JAMIE HOROWITZ, JOSE HERRERA & LEE ROSENBERG,
PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA: AN
ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.96, at 9, 51
(2013)).
111. See Practice Areas: AAA Consumer and Employment Arbitration Statistics, AM.
ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/Consumer (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
112. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2900. A research team analyzed the
AAA’s disclosures regarding claims that had been filed and closed between July 2009 and
June 2014 (and thus were governed by the 2003 version of California’s disclosure
requirements). They found disclosures regarding 7,303 consumer claims, excluding real
estate and construction, and the disclosures generally revealed
the names of the business entity and of the arbitrators and lawyers (if
appearing), as well as whether the claim closed by settlement or award, the
amounts sought, the fees, and fee allocations between the disputants. Of the
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was “spotty.”113 It does not appear that any dispute resolution provider has
suffered any negative consequence as a result of the failure to make the
disclosures required by California.114
Three other jurisdictions have also enacted arbitration disclosure
requirements: Maine,115 Maryland,116 and the District of Columbia.117 All
are patterned after California’s 2003 statute, although they include
variations.
The District of Columbia’s reporting requirements, which became
effective in 2008, look much like those in California.118 However, the
5,224 claims “terminated by an award,” about half included a dollar figure.
Id. at 2899-900. Resnik also observes, “The information on prevailing parties comes with the
caveat that arbitrators are the source; the AAA has not ‘reviewed, investigated, or evaluated
the accuracy or completeness’ of such information.” Id. at 2900; see also Resnik, A2J, supra
note 2, at 649 (observing that arbitration files are not accessible and often are held by
individual arbitrators, not the reporting dispute resolution providers, and that the providers
do not independently verify the individual arbitrators’ reports; also noting that “coding errors
can occur at both individual and aggregate levels” and providing an example of sixty-two
cases in which the consumers were coded erroneously as seeking exactly the same amount
and receiving exactly the same award).
113. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 6, at 2898; see also Amsler, supra note 6, at
42 (noting that California data was incomplete, thus precluding systematic analysis of
outcomes (citing Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Jean R. Sternlight & John C. Healey, Arbitration
Data Disclosure in California: What We Have and What We Need (Apr. 15, 2005)
(unpublished paper presented at the American Bar Association Section of Dispute
Resolution Conference in Los Angeles))).
114. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(f) provides: “It is the intent of the Legislature that
private arbitration companies comply with all legal obligations of this section.” However,
there is no express provision for enforcement of such obligation. See, e.g., Appellants’
Opening Brief at 10, Cross Country Bank v. California, No. A108572 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
2005), 2005 WL 677738 (observing that in dicta, the trial court in the case had noted that an
arbitration agreement naming NAF as the provider “might be unenforceable” due to NAF’s
failure to comply with the California disclosure requirements, but also noting the lack of any
express provision for such disqualification). But see Honeycutt v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, 270-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (entering a judgment of vacatur of
arbitral award in employment matter due to arbitrator’s failure to make disclosures as
required by California statute and ethics provisions).
115. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (2010).
116. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West 2011).
117. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4430 (West 2008).
118. Interestingly, the District of Columbia’s reporting requirements also provide for the
waiver of arbitration fees and costs “for any person having a gross monthly income that is
less than 300% of the federal poverty guidelines issued annually by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services.” Id. § 16-4430(d)(1). The District of Columbia’s
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District of Columbia specifically provides for enforcement by permitting
any person or entity affected by a violation of the provisions to seek an
injunction against, and appropriate restitution from, the allegedly violating
arbitration organization. If the person or entity bringing the action prevails,
or if the arbitration organization voluntarily complies after the
commencement of the action, then the arbitration organization can be held
liable for the person or entity’s attorney’s fees and costs.119
In addition, the District of Columbia requires each dispute resolution
provider to disclose any financial interests that the provider has in a party or
the legal representation of a party, as well as any financial interests that a
party has in the provider.120 This additional requirement is consistent with
the recommendations of scholars and the CPR-Georgetown Commission on
Ethics and Standards in the Practice of ADR121 and addresses important
provision also requires dispute resolution organizations to provide notice to consumers
regarding the potential for waiver of fees. Id. § 16-4430(f). The District of Columbia also
does not permit arbitrators or arbitration organizations to administer consumer arbitrations
pursuant to an agreement or rule that requires the non-prevailing consumer to pay the fees
and costs of the opposing party. Id. § 16-4430(g). See Brief of Appellant, Keeton v. Wells
Fargo Corp., 987 A.2d 1118 (D.C. 2009) (No. 08-CV-990), in which a consumer argued that
an arbitration provision should not be enforced because the arbitration provider refused to
provide for a waiver of fees, despite the requirements of the District of Columbia’s
provision. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals ultimately required the trial court to
permit discovery and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the unconscionability of the
arbitration agreement. Keeton, 987 A.2d at 1118.
119. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4430(i).
120. Id. § 16-4430(h). Maine also requires disclosures regarding financial interest. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394(1)(K) (2010).
121. In 2002, the CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards in the Practice
of ADR published the CPR-Georgetown Principles for ADR Provider Organizations. These
principles include the following regarding disclosures:
ADR Provider Organizations should take all reasonable steps to provide clear,
accurate and understandable information about the following aspects of their
services and operations:
a. The nature of the ADR Provider Organization‘s services, operations,
and fees;
b. The relevant economic, legal, professional or other relationships
between the ADR Provider Organization and its affiliated neutrals;
c. The ADR Provider Organization‘s policies relating to confidentiality,
organizational and individual conflicts of interests, and ethical
standards for neutrals and the Organization;
d. Training and qualifications requirements for neutrals affiliated with
the Organization, as well as other selection criteria for affiliation;
and
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concerns regarding the potential for conflicts of interest. Such concerns
were heightened after the Minnesota Attorney General brought a highly
publicized suit against the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), a dispute
resolution provider that conducted consumer arbitrations pursuant to
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses.122 The Attorney General alleged
that NAF and its operations had become financially entangled with lawyers

e. The method by which neutrals are selected for service.
....
. . . The ADR Provider Organization should disclose the existence of any
interests or relationships which are reasonably likely to affect the impartiality
or independence of the Organization or which might reasonably create the
appearance that the Organization is biased against a party or favorable to
another, including (i) any financial or other interest by the Organization in the
outcome; (ii) any significant financial, business, organizational, professional or
other relationship that the Organization has with any of the parties or their
counsel, including a contractual stream of referrals, a de facto stream of
referrals, or a funding relationship between a party and the organization; or (iii)
any other significant source of bias or prejudice concerning the Organization
which is reasonably likely to affect impartiality or might reasonably create an
appearance of partiality or bias.
CPR-GEORGETOWN COMM’N ON ETHICS & STANDARDS OF PRACTICE IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR
ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS 9-10 (May 1, 2002), https://www.cpradr.org/resourcecenter/protocols-guidelines/ethics-codes/principles-for-adr-provider-organizations/_res/
id=Attachments/index=0/Principles-for-ADR-Provider-Organizations.pdf
[hereinafter
PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS]; see also Welsh, Mandatory Predispute
Consumer Arbitration, supra note 6, at 225-26 (suggesting disclosures of the following in
order to understand the operation of any negotiated or facilitated processes that precede
arbitration—e.g., “written policies (or performance evaluation factors) to guide employees’
decisions regarding the amount of their first [and subsequent] settlement offers to
consumers”; the number of times that a consumer must refuse “settlement offers in order to
be offered the full amount of [their] claim”; the length of time that employees wait before
the consumer’s selection of an arbitrator to offer the full amount requested by a consumer;
also suggesting disclosure of the following regarding arbitration—e.g., how the “available
pool of arbitrators [was] selected for these types of cases;” how arbitrators are selected for
particular cases; the “contractual and financial relationship” between companies and their
arbitral provider(s); the company’s “share of each arbitral provider's gross and net
revenues”; the “potential for the arbitral provider, or individual arbitrators, to receive
bonuses for their work” for a company and the basis for such bonuses; the information that
the company receives about “the claims made by consumers, the results of these claims and
the arbitrators responsible for deciding the claims”; how the company has used this
information; and whether the company has ever used this information to “improve its
products or services” and, if yes, in what way).
122. See generally Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough,” supra note 6, at 427-30.
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and other actors involved in debt collection matters subject to arbitration.123
NAF subsequently entered into a settlement with the Attorney General and
discontinued its provision of consumer arbitrations pursuant to mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
Maine also requires a disclosure regarding financial interests that could
represent a conflict of interest. In addition, the consumer protection division
of Maine’s Office of the Attorney General is directly involved in
publicizing dispute resolution providers’ disclosures to consumers.
Specifically, each dispute resolution provider must notify the Attorney
General of the website where its disclosures are posted (and must provide
notification of the discontinuation of the use of such website), and the
Attorney General is required to include links on its own publicly accessible
website.124
Maryland varies from both California and Maine in additionally
requiring disclosure of the address where a consumer arbitration was
conducted.125
F. Disclosures by Users of Dispute Resolution Services
Some proponents of international commercial and investor-state
arbitration have pioneered online initiatives that empower users of dispute
resolution services to publicize information regarding their experience with
international arbitrators and arbitration.126 For example, the non-profit
organization Arbitrator Intelligence solicits arbitral awards from users and
posts them online. In addition, Arbitrator Intelligence uses a two-phase
Arbitrator Intelligence Questionnaire (“AIQ”) to collect both objective
123. Id.; Consent Decree, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, No. 27-CV-07-18550
(Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009), http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf;
Deepak Gupta, Consent Decree in Minnesota v. NAF, Pub. Citizen (July 20, 2009, 11:38
AM),
http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2009/07/consent-decree-in-minnesota-v-naf.html
(press release regarding the consent decree).
124. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394(2) (West 2010).
125. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903(a)(11) (West 2011). Maryland also varies
from both California and Maine in not requiring disclosures regarding the arbitration of
employment-related disputes or the number of times that a non-consumer has been a party in
a mediation conducted by the disclosing dispute resolution organization. Id. § 14-3903(a)(2),
(5).
126. See, e.g., Contribute an Award, ARB. INTELLIGENCE, https://web.archive.org/web/
20180630230841/http://www.arbitratorintelligence.org/contribute-award/ (last visited Jan.
13, 2019). The same trend is occurring for international commercial mediation. See e.g.,
Find IMI-Certified Professionals, INT’L MEDIATION INST., https://imimediation.org/certifiedmediator-search (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
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information and subjective assessments from users and counsel regarding
individual arbitrators’ case management (e.g., ordering of interim measures
and document production), decision-making (e.g., interpretive
methodologies), and timeliness in the issuance of awards.127 When enough
anonymized data has been collected as a result of users’ completion of
questionnaires, Arbitrator Intelligence intends to publish “AI Reports”
regarding individual arbitrators.128 These reports will be available, for a fee,
to users, counsel, institutions, and arbitrators, provided that the profiled
arbitrator consents to such publication.129 The underlying data that
Arbitrator Intelligence gathered also will be made available to cooperating
arbitral institutions.130
Consumer advocates and academics have urged similar initiatives for
domestic consumer arbitration. Professor Lisa Amsler, for example, has
proposed that one-shot players might increase transparency and improve
their experience in consumer arbitration if they are trained to identify key
procedural elements and then upload their assessments and other
information to an online platform that would be widely accessible—and
potentially quite influential in the aggregate (e.g., TripAdvisor).131 Based in
part on suggestions made during a National Roundtable on Consumer
127. See FAQs About the AIQ, ARB. INTELLIGENCE, https://www.arbitratorintelligence.
org/faq// (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
128. See id. (answering the question “How will information from the AIQs be made
available?”).
129. See id. (answering the question “How does the AIQ ensure that feedback is fair to
arbitrators?”).
130. See id.; see also About Us, ARB. INTELLIGENCE, https://www.arbitratorintelligence.
org/about-us (last visited Jan. 13, 2019); Linda Gharib, Wolters Kluwer Announces
Collaboration with Arbitrator Intelligence, WOLTERS KLUWER (June 26, 2017),
https://wolterskluwer.com/company/newsroom/news/2017/06/wolters-kluwer-announcescollaboration-with-arbitrator-intelligence.html.
131. See Amsler, supra note 6; see also Alyson Carrel & Alan Boudreau, Crowdsourcing
and Mediation: A New Approach to Social Justice Critiques, Presentation at ABA Dispute
Resolution Section Annual Conference (Apr. 17, 2015) and Association of Conflict
Resolution (Mar. 25, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/crowdsourcing-mediation; Alyson Carrel &
Alan Boudreau, Crowdsourcing: Can Today's Technology Answer Yesterday's Social Justice
Critique of Mediation? (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (proposing use of
crowdsourcing to bring transparency to mediated settlements, referencing glassdoor.com and
others for potential templates, and noting that questions regarding confidentiality and
logistics must be resolved); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert Dingwall,
Negotiating with Scripts and Playbooks: What to Do When Big Bad Companies Won’t
Negotiate, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S DESK REFERENCE 717-18 (Christopher Honeyman &
Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2017).
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Arbitration,132 Professor Tom Stipanowich developed a “Fairness Index”
that users similarly could access in order to provide feedback on arbitration
services.133
There are some particularly notable examples of institutional repeat
players’ willingness to cooperate with the publication of information
regarding their internal dispute resolution programs. Professor Alan
Morrison, for example, has used the annual reports published by the Office
of the Independent Administrator—which administers arbitrations between
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and its health plan members in
California—to assess the fairness of Kaiser Permanente’s mandatory
medical malpractice arbitration program.134 Professor Morrison has called
for others to engage in greater in-depth analysis of this program, with
access to data beyond what was contained in the annual reports.135

132. See STIPANOWICH ET AL., supra note 6; see also Nancy A. Welsh & Lipsky, “Moving
the Ball Forward,” supra note 7.
133. See Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index, supra note 6, at 991-92. See
generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, An “Arbitration Fairness Index”: A Rating System for
Consumer and Employment Arbitration Programs, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2013, at 30.
134. See Alan B. Morrison, Can Mandatory Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims
Be Fair? The Kaiser Permanente System, 70 DISP. RESOL. J. 35, 35-36 (2015) (using
available data to determine whether this type of mandatory arbitration can be “operated in a
manner in which those who must use it to resolve their claims receive a fair hearing and a
reasonable opportunity to recover their damages”). These reports include information on the
process used to close cases, time to closure, claimants’ win rates, and parties’ and counsel’s
assessments of the arbitrators and process. Morrison supplemented his review of the annual
reports with interviews with the independent Administrator and Kaiser-Permanente officials.
Id. Also, it should be noted that Kaiser Permanente developed its current arbitration program
following the California Supreme Court’s severe criticism of the prior program in Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997). Morrison, supra, at 36; see also
Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute System Design, 14
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 134-44 (2009) (describing the design process that led to Kaiser
Permanente’s current arbitration program).
135. See Morrison, supra note 134, at 59 n.71. Notably, Professor Morrison concluded
that Kaiser Permanente’s arbitration system was less expensive for claimants and thus made
it more possible to bring small- and medium-size claims, was faster than litigation, permitted
claimants to present their cases fully, and produced “reasonably just” outcomes. Id. at 59. He
added that “[t]he loss of a public trial before a jury is a negative, but whether it outweighs
the positives is a question that will not be answered in the same way by everyone.” Id.
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G. Proposed Transparency Requirements for ODR
A last recent development involves online dispute resolution (“ODR”).
Increasingly, courts, agencies, and repeat litigants (e.g., insurers,
manufacturers, employers) are expressing interest in using ODR to resolve
relatively routine, low-dollar disputes. ODR creates the opportunity for
collecting and analyzing substantial amounts of data, which can then be
used to detect problematic patterns.136 At the same time, the public is
increasingly aware of the dangers presented by involvement with the online
world, including the potential for security breaches,137 victimization as a
result of inaccurate information,138 and unfairness as a result of biased

136. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, The New New Courts, 67 AM. U. L. REV.
165, 192 (2017). Rabonivich-Einy and Katsh described data collected and used by British
Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal (CRT):
The CRT team constantly seeks feedback from both satisfied and unsatisfied
users to improve the process, identify problems, and replicate successful
elements. They collect data in a myriad of ways available only because of the
CRT’s online nature: active user input given through rating and ranking, open
text boxes, ex-post feedback, and analysis of dispute resolution data. Indeed,
CRT developers have devoted significant efforts and resources to the
development and refinement of categorizations of claims and defenses in order
to allow for meaningful use of the data. Such data helps to improve the CRT
and the diagnosis phase, and, perhaps more importantly, helps prevent future
claims.
As the CRT team has recognized, learning from data and prevention of
problems need not be limited to the improvement of the system itself, but could
be viewed as a broader goal of the legal system. As use of online systems
expands and data is stored and studied more extensively by courts, they will be
able to detect, through such indicators as spikes in particular claims, that there
is a regulatory gap or a need for better enforcement of existing laws in certain
areas. In this way, dispute resolution data collected in courts can be used to
prevent future disputes from occurring.
Id.
137. See, e.g., Nick Clements, Equifax’s Enormous Data Breach Just Got Even Bigger,
FORBES
(Mar.
5,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nickclements/2018/03/05/
equifaxs-enormous-data-breach-just-got-even-bigger/#479b18dc53bc;
Reuters,
Target
Settles 2013 Hacked Customer Data Breach for $18.5 Million, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2017),
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/target-settles-2013-hacked-customerdata-breach-18-5-million-n764031.
138. See, e.g., Aaron Klein, The Real Problem with Credit Reports Is the Astounding
Number of Errors, CNBC (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/27/the-realproblem-with-credit-reports-is-the-astounding-number-of-errors-equifax-commentary.html.
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algorithms.139 Consequently, many ODR advocates are calling for ODR
procedures to be made transparent and accountable, with required reporting
regarding the number of people using them, their substantive results, users’
perceptions of the ODR process’s fairness, demographic patterns, and the
results of algorithmic audits.140
139. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH U. L. REV. 1249,
1257 (2008) (discussing the Terrorist Surveillance Program and warning that
“unsophisticated algorithms and faulty data” can “generate high rates of false positives” that
then “serve as a basis for baseless, stigmatizing criminal investigations”); Anjanette H.
Raymond, Emma Arrington Stone Young & Scott J. Shackelford, Building a Better HAL
9000: Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraining of Bias, 15 NW. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 222-40 (2018) [hereinafter Raymond, Engraining of Bias]
(including discussion of predictive policing); Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford,
Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?, 35
MICH. J. INT’L L. 485 (2014) [hereinafter Raymond & Shackelford, Access to Justice].
140. See, e.g., JOINT TECH. COMM’N, JTC RESOURCE BULLETIN: ODR FOR COURTS 15-16
(version 2.0, Nov. 29, 2017) (“Processes and algorithms that impact decisions should be
available for scrutiny.”); Dafna Lavi, Three Is Not a Crowd: Online Mediation-Arbitration
in Business to Consumer Internet Disputes, 37 U. PA. J. INTL. L. 871, 932-33, 936 (2016)
(citing Amy J. Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering
Consumers Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 198 (2010)) (discussing
trustmarks, with reporting to regulatory agencies for failure to comply with requirements of
trustmarks, and online posting of consumers’ opinions regarding ODR services);
Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 136, at 211 (calling for transparency in a court-based
public online dispute resolution system regarding any use of Big Data for dispute prevention
activities and observing that such transparency could serve as a model for private ODR
systems); Anjanette H. Raymond, A Meeting of the Minds: Online Dispute Resolution
Regulations Should Be Opportunity Focused, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 189, 211, 214 (2016)
(calling for a “transparent system” that provides “information to consumers, allowing
aggregation of data to reveal contractual discrimination, and lessening information
imbalances that erode trust and hinder an open system of justice” as well as a platform that is
“monitored with an eye toward eliminating all types of bias and/or undue or improper
influence”); Anjanette Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Jury Glasses: Wearable
Technology and Its Role in Crowdsourcing Justice, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 115,
148 (2015) (arguing for the creation of a platform auditor that tracks and analyzes outcomes
and checks coding and presentation for intentional and unintentional influences contained
within the system); Scott J. Shackelford & Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual
Courthouse: Ethical Considerations for Design, Implementation, and Regulation in the
World of ODR, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 615, 634; Nancy A. Welsh, ODR: A Time for Celebration
and the Embrace of Procedural Safeguards, Address Before the 15th ODR Conference (May
23, 2016), http://www.adrhub.com/profiles/blogs/procedural-justice-in-odr (calling for
algorithmic audits and alternative forums for those who do not have access to, or facility
with, online options); see also Suzanne Van Arsdale, User Protections in Online Dispute
Resolution, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 107, 128–29 (2015); Noam Ebner & John Zeleznikow,
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The example of federal and state courts, as well as the developments
involving quasi-public and private organizations and self-help initiatives as
described supra, strongly suggest a trend toward some degree of
transparency—what this Article will term “measured transparency”—in
order to assure the integrity and trustworthiness of “private” dispute
resolution processes. It is at this point, then, that this Article turns to dispute
resolution neutrals’ ethical obligations and their relationship with
transparency.
IV. Dispute Resolution Ethics and Transparency: Focus on the Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators
In light of the Article’s primary focus to this point on the value of
transparency in connection with the use and outcomes of mandatory predispute consumer and employment arbitration, it would be reasonable to
turn now to the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.
After examining the ethical obligations of arbitrators, the Article might then
begin to consider other dispute resolution neutrals’ ethics—e.g.,
mediators,141 dispute resolution organizations,142 ODR providers,143
ombudspersons,144 and even state145 and federal judges.146
Fairness, Trust and Security in Online Dispute Resolution, 36 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y
143 (2015); Noam Ebner & John Zeleznikow, No Sheriff in Town: Governance for Online
Dispute Resolution, 32 NEGOT. J. 297 (2016); Menkel-Meadow & Dingwall, supra note 131;
Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Digital Justice: Reshaping Boundaries in an Online
Dispute Resolution Environment, 1 INT’L J. ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 5, 28 (2014); Raymond &
Shackelford, Access to Justice, supra note 139; SCHMITZ & RULE, supra note 84; Amy J.
Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating “Haves” from “HaveNots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411; Leah Wing, Ethical Principles for Online Dispute
Resolution: A GPS Device for the Field, 3 INTL. J. ON ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 12, 25 (2016)
(calling for the accountability as one of a proposed set of ethical principles for online dispute
resolution). These calls for transparency join those made by information privacy scholars
who point to technology’s challenge to the efficacy of current procedural due process
jurisprudence. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249 (2008).
141. See generally MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS PMBL. (AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, AM. BAR ASS’N, AND ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2005)
[hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT].
142. See generally PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 121.
143. See generally Ethical Principles for Online Dispute Resolution, ODR.INFO,
http://odr.info/ethics-and-odr/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
144. See generally IOA Code of Ethics, INT’L OMBUDSMAN ASS’N (rev. Jan. 2007),
http://www.ombudsassociation.org/IOA_Main/media/SiteFiles/Code_Ethics_1-07.pdf.
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Because there are now discussions regarding potential revisions to the
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, however, the Article will turn
at this point to the ethical obligations of mediators. As noted previously, the
use of mediation is mimicking arbitration in key respects. Mandatory
mediation is most frequently associated with courts, but private contracts of
adhesion increasingly contain mandatory pre-dispute mediation clauses.
Thus, like consumer and employment arbitration, mediation is imposed
upon parties, and many commentators have raised concerns over the years
about the fairness of the process for those who are less powerful.147 Most
145. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
146. See generally CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (U.S. COURTS 2018).
It is worth noting that judges and lawyers might also reasonably be expected to support
transparency as a means to protect the integrity of the judicial system. However, this is not
the case. Indeed, it is striking how many lawyers opt out of the judicial system and into
arbitration for disputes with their clients over fees or malpractice. Neither the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct nor ABA ethics opinions require any data or general
transparency regarding the extent of this practice. Rather, the ABA requires only that
lawyers make disclosures to their clients regarding the arbitration provisions contained in
retainer agreements, gain the clients’ informed consent, and provide for the availability of
common law or statutory remedies. See Feldman v. Davis, 53 So.3d 1132, 1136-37 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Brian Cressman, Comment, Bezio v. Draeger: A Missed Opportunity
for a Doctrinal Solution to the Jurisdictional Split as to the Arbitrability of Legal
Malpractice Claims, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 359 (2014); Terese Schireson, Comment,
The Ethical Lawyer-Client Arbitration Clause, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 547 (2015); Chrissy L.
Schwennsen, Case Note, Arbitration Clauses in Fee Retainer Agreements, 3 ST. MARY’S J.
LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 330 (2013) (surveying state and ABA ethics opinions,
provisions); ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 02-425 (2002)
(finding arbitration clause permissible if client is fully apprised of advantages and
disadvantages to permit informed decision and clause does not insulate lawyer from liability
or limit liability to which she would otherwise be exposed under common or statutory law);
Prof’l Ethics, Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. No. 586 (2008) (requiring informed
consent, requiring clause to be fair and reasonable to client; referencing Rule 1.08, Comment
2); see also Susan Sabb Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy: Prying Open the Courthouse
Doors for Legal Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033 (2017).
147. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Carol
Izumi, Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 71
(2010); Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from
Procedural and Social Justice Theory, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49 (2004); Eric K. Yamamoto,
ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055 (1996). In 2017, SMU
Law Review published a two-part symposium issue reconsidering these critiques of ADR.
The issue included articles by Professors Delgado, Michael Green, Carol Izumi, Andrea
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recently, legislative mandates to participate in foreclosure mediation have
triggered particular attention to these concerns.148
Even though there is currently no federal statute149 providing for narrow
and deferential judicial review or expedited judicial enforcement of
mediated settlement agreements, traditional legal research150 and available
metrics151 suggest that federal and state courts tend to treat mediated
settlement agreements as “super-contracts”152 with nearly automatic
entitlement to judicial support and enforcement. An international
Schneider, Nancy Welsh, Eric Yamamoto, Deborah Hensler, Pat Chew, Sarah Cole, Charles
Craver and Lisa Blomgren Amsler, among others. Gilat Bachar and Professor Deborah
Hensler undertook to identify all of the empirical efforts to test Professor Delgado’s
hypothesis that mediation (and arbitration) create systematic differences in dispute resolution
outcomes by gender, race, ethnicity, or socio-economic status. Ultimately, they found the
results to be contrary and inconclusive, and they called for such research to be undertaken.
Gilat J. Bachar & Deborah R. Hensler, Does Alternative Dispute Resolution Facilitate
Prejudice and Bias? We Still Don’t Know, 70 SMU L. REV. 817, 829-30 (2017).
148. See Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a
Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1946 n.242 (2013) [hereinafter
Nussbaum, ADR’s Place] (citing Admin. Office of the Courts, Supreme Court of Nev.,
Foreclosure Mediation Program Beneficiary Compliance Outcomes (2012),
http://www.nevadajudiciary.us/index.php/viewdocumentsandforms/func-startdown/8318
[hereinafter Foreclosure Mediation Program] (detailing the extent to which the six primary
loan servicers in Nevada (Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Ally/GMAC,
US Bank, CitiGroup) and others complied with statutory requirements of the state
foreclosure mediation program, such as attendance at mediation, production of required
documents, authority to negotiate, and good faith participation)); Lydia Nussbaum,
Mediation as Regulation: Expanding State Governance over Private Disputes, 2016 UTAH
L. REV. 361, 412 [hereinafter Nussbaum, Mediation as Regulation] (pointing out that the
foreclosure crisis ultimately required the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and legal action by the U.S. Department of Justice and the state attorneys general
from forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, and observing that “policymakers need
to be aware that, while it may appear more politically expedient to require parties to mediate
and then shape their behavior within the context of mediation, direct government
intervention may be required to achieve the intended policy outcome”).
149. In contrast, the Federal Arbitration Act provides very limited grounds for vacating
an arbitral award, and the courts have developed a deferential standard of review. See Welsh,
Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, supra note 6, at 206.
150. See Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 4, at 59-78.
151. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 4, at 74.
152. See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 483 (5th ed.
2014); see also Lydia Nussbaum, Trial and Error: Legislating ADR for Medical Malpractice
Reform, 76 MD. L. REV. 247, 269 (2017) (describing, in the medical malpractice context,
how some states have “deputiz[ed] screening panels to formalize settlement agreements and
render them binding so parties can skip going to court for a final judgment and order”).
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convention to formalize expedited enforcement of mediated settlement
agreements, meanwhile, has recently been adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly.153
All of these developments indicate that establishing an appropriate
degree of transparency is relevant for mediation.154
153. The United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting
from Mediation will be known as the "Singapore Convention on Mediation." See Press
Release, U.N. Info. Serv., General Assembly Adopts the United Nations Convention on
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Dec. 21, 2018), http://
www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2018/unisl271.html. The Singapore Convention is
modeled upon the New York Convention, which requires signatory nations’ courts to
recognize and enforce international commercial arbitration awards with only narrow grounds
for the denial of such enforcement. Article 1 of the Singapore Convention specifically
excludes employment, family, and consumer matters. See Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep.
on the Work of Its Fifty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/496, at 11, https://undocs.org/
en/A/73/496. The UNCITRAL Working Group’s documents regarding the Singapore
Convention are available at Working Group II: 2000 to Present: Arbitration and
Conciliation / Dispute Settlement, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). See also Hal
Abramson, New Singapore Convention on Cross-Border Mediated Settlements: Key
Choices, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES
(Catharine Titi & Katia FachGomez eds., Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2019); S. I.
Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International Commercial
Mediation, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973 (2016); Ellen E. Deason, Enforcement of
Settlement Agreements in International Commercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?,
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2015, at 32; Luke Nottage, In/formalization and Glocalisation of
International Commercial Arbitration and Investment Treaty Arbitration in Asia, in
FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 67, at 211
(pointing to lack of expedited enforceability as one reason for mediation’s lack of success in
moving into the international commercial arbitration or investor state arbitration context;
also as a reason that elite law firms continue to dominate the international dispute resolution
world).
154. In some respects, mediation presents a more difficult case than arbitration because
the process promises confidentiality in order to encourage the candor and free flow of
information needed to arrive at settlements. Indeed, Professor Lydia Nussbaum has pointed
out the conflict that can exist between mediation’s promise of confidentiality and state
legislatures’ policy goals in mandating mediation, particularly in the foreclosure context:
[M]aking decisions about policy reform requires access to information, but the
mediation process can obscure information with its confidentiality protections
and individualized approach to dispute resolution. Therefore, legislatures
should spend time considering whether “nudging” more disputes to resolve out
of the public eye, erodes transparency and undermines the state’s interest in
protecting consumers. Will families be able to assess the safety practices of an
adult care home if previous complaints were resolved in confidential mediation
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Therefore, this Article now turns to the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators (“Model Standards”) originally adopted by the American Bar
Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution, American Arbitration
Association, and Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (“SPIDR”)
in 1994, and then revised and adopted as revised by the American Bar
Association, AAA, and ACR (the successor to SPIDR) in 2005. The Model
Standards have been very influential. Most courts, bar associations, and
other organizations in the United States have looked to the Model Standards
as templates for ethical requirements for their mediators.155
The Model Standards certainly invoke the importance of gaining and
retaining the public’s trust and protecting the integrity of the mediation
process. The Preamble, for example, quickly establishes that one of the
Standards’ primary goals is “to promote public confidence in mediation as a
process for resolving disputes.”156 Neither here nor elsewhere, however, do
the Model Standards provide for any duty actually owed by mediators to

sessions? How can consumer advocates identify patterns of misconduct by loan
servicers or telecommunications carriers if individual claims are resolved
quietly, one at a time? Whether the state should relinquish its power over
dispute resolution outcomes, and whether parties, often unequally matched, can
actually regulate each other in settlement negotiations, are questions hotly
debated by scholars. Policymakers should be thoughtful about what kinds of
disputes may have significance to the public. Some existing proposals for
preserving public information while encouraging settlement include requiring
parties to report the outcome of settlements negotiated in mediation in a
national database or for the parties themselves to make mediated settlement
terms publically [sic] available.
Nussbaum, Mediation as Regulation, supra note 148, at 412-13. Others have pointed to the
confidentiality offered by mediation as a means to avoid the increasing transparency of
arbitration. See, e.g., Shahla F. Ali & Odysseas G. Repousis, Investor-State Mediation and
the Rise of Transparency in International Investment Law: Opportunity or Threat?, 45
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225, 228-29 (2017) (“If this treaty [for the enforcement of
mediated settlement agreements] were to be concluded, would it mean that investor-state
mediation would not only be a convenient method to avoid the high levels of transparency
now paradigmatic to investor-state arbitration, but would also enjoy high levels of
international enforceability?”).
155. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 152, at 401. There are exceptions, of course. In
Florida, for example, the ethics provisions regulating court-certified mediators (as well as
mediators handling court-connected cases) preceded the 1994 Model Standards.
156. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, at pmbl..
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demonstrate to the public on a systemic basis that the mediation process is
deserving of trust and confidence.157
Meanwhile, the Model Standards frequently reference mediators’ duty to
protect the integrity of the mediation process in individual cases. For
example, Standard III, “Conflicts of Interest,” provides that while a
mediator is required to disclose conflicts of interest, she is also required to
withdraw from or decline to proceed with a mediation when the conflict
“might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity of mediation.”158
Also pursuant to Standard III, a mediator is required to avoid establishing a
relationship with a mediation participant if “that would raise questions
about the integrity of the mediation.”159 Standard VII, “Advertising and
Solicitation,” provides that a mediator’s solicitations for business must be
constrained in order to avoid “giv[ing] the appearance of partiality for or
against a party or otherwise undermin[ing] the integrity of the process.”160
In addition to focusing on individual cases rather than systemic needs, these
standards consistently establish what a mediator must not do. A mediator
must not proceed to serve as a mediator if a conflict of interest exists. A
mediator must not establish a relationship with a mediation participant. A
mediator must not engage in troublesome business solicitations. All of these
prohibitions exist to protect the integrity of the mediation process. No
standard referencing integrity establishes an affirmative requirement,
however, such as taking action to support reasonable—or “measured”161—
transparency regarding the use or outcomes of the mediation process.162
157. See Omer Shapira, A Critical Assessment of the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators (2005): Call for Reform, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 81, 95-104 (2016) (urging that the
Model Standards should be revised to make it clear that mediators owe a duty to the public,
not just the parties); see also Alyson Carrel & Lin Adrian, Regulating Mediator Practice,
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2017, at 21, 23 (distinguishing the Model Standards from the
mediation statutes and rules developed in Florida; noting that the Florida rules “don’t just
discuss promoting public confidence as an aspirational goal but explicitly state that these
rules are meant to ‘ensure protection of the participants in mediation and the public.’”).
158. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, at Standard III.E. Christopher
Honeyman has chronicled situational and structural biases in mediation that actually are
endemic to the process—e.g., a situational bias toward the interests of the party that
provided or hired the mediator, a structural bias toward moderates as compared to radicals—
that may be best resolved by disclosure. See Christopher Honeyman, Patterns of Bias in
Mediation, 1985 MO. J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 142-43, 146.
159. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, at Standard III.F.
160. Id. at Standard VII.B.
161. The term “measured transparency” comes from Dispute Resolution Data. See What
Does the Data Show?, supra note 96 (“The use of data in international commercial
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Standards IV, “Competence,” and VI, “Quality of the Process,” provide
for some affirmative ethical obligations regarding the assurance of quality,
but their scope is limited to the parties participating in a mediation. For
example, Standard IV notes that “[a] person who offers to serve as a
mediator creates the expectation that the person is competent to mediate
effectively” and urges that a mediator should both attend relevant
educational programs and make available to the parties information that is
“relevant to the mediator’s training, education, experience and approach in
conducting a mediation.”163 Standard VI provides that a mediator must
conduct a mediation “in a manner that promotes . . . party participation
[and] procedural fairness.”164 If a party appears to have difficulty
comprehending the process, issues, or settlement options, or difficulty
participating in a mediation, then the mediator should explore the
circumstances and potential accommodations, modifications, or adjustments
that would make possible the party’s capacity to comprehend, participate,
and exercise self-determination. These actions certainly are consistent with
a mediator’s obligation to protect the integrity of the mediation process, but
it is noteworthy that their reach is entirely limited to the mediator’s
interaction with the parties participating in mediation.
Standard IX, “Advancement of Mediation Practice,” is the only standard
that begins to hint at the value of monitoring mediation and providing
information about the process to the larger public. This standard provides
that a mediator should “act in a manner that advances the practice of
arbitrations and mediations, measured transparency, and the opportunity for new scholarly
research has arrived!”).
162. Interestingly, even though Standard IV, Competence, does not specifically reference
the need to consider the public and protect the integrity of the mediation process, the
Reporter’s Notes observe:
The Model Standards (September 2005) retains the commitment expressed in
the 1994 Version that the Standards not create artificial or arbitrary barriers to
serve the public as a mediator. But to promote public confidence in the integrity
and usefulness of the process and to protect the members of the public, an
individual representing himself or herself as a mediator must be committed to
serving only in those situations for which he or she possesses the basic
competency to assist.
Joseph B. Stulberg, Reporter’s Notes, JOINT COMM. FOR MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
FOR MEDIATORS 14 (Sept. 9, 2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
2011_build/dispute_resolution/mscm_reporternotes.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter
Reporter’s Notes].
163. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, supra note 141, at Standard IV.A.
164. Id. at Standard VI.A.
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mediation” and may promote the standard by “[p]articipating in research
when given the opportunity, including obtaining participant feedback when
appropriate.”165 Standard V, “Confidentiality,” however, cautions that “[i]f
a mediator participates in . . . research or evaluation of mediation, the
mediator should protect the anonymity of the parties and abide by their
reasonable expectations regarding confidentiality.”166
Interestingly, in 2001, the American Bar Association’s House of
Delegates adopted standards for the mediation of family and divorce
matters that included an appendix with special policy considerations for the
state regulation of family mediators and court-affiliated programs. Two of
these special considerations make clear that confidentiality could and
should co-exist with sufficient transparency to ensure consumer protection.
Specifically, the Appendix provides:
. . . Individual states or local courts should set standards and
qualifications for family mediators including procedures for
evaluations and handling grievances against mediators. In
developing these standards and qualifications, regulators should
consult with appropriate professional groups, including
professional associations of family mediators.
....
. . . Confidentiality should not be construed to limit or prohibit
the effective monitoring, research or evaluation of mediation
programs by responsible individuals or academic institutions
provided that no identifying information about any person
involved in the mediation is disclosed without their prior written
consent. Under appropriate circumstances, researchers may be
permitted to obtain access to statistical data and, with the
permission of the participants, to individual case files,
observations of live mediations, and interviews with
participants.167

165. Id. at Standard IX.
166. Id. at Standard V.A.
167. See Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice for Family
and Divorce Mediation, MEDIATE, Standard XIII, https://www.mediate.com/
articles/afccstds.cfm (last visited Dec. 11, 2018) (adopted by the American Bar Association,
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Association for Conflict Resolution and
Mediate.com) [hereinafter Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of
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The failure of the subsequently adopted 2005 Model Standards to include
this sort of clear endorsement of measured transparency for court-connected
mediation is both noteworthy and confusing. The International Mediation
Institute (IMI) Code of Conduct provides another model for encouraging
accountability. Standard 1.3.2 makes mediators’ solicitation of parties’
feedback mandatory.168
There have been efforts to encourage reporting and greater transparency
regarding mediation. Not long after the adoption of the 2005 Standards, for
example, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution’s Research and Statistics
Task Force, chaired by Professor Lisa Bingham (now Amsler), developed a
list of key data elements that every court should collect on mediation
programs.169 Resolution Systems Institute (RSI), in collaboration with the
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, undertook a multi-year initiative to
develop model post-mediation questionnaires170 in order to increase public
knowledge regarding the incidence and effects of court-connected
mediation. In 2012, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution’s Task Force
on Mediator Credentialing recommended that mediator-credentialing
organizations provide accessible, transparent systems to register
Practice]; Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/resources/attorneys/model_
standards_ofpracticeforfamiliesindivorcemediation.html (approving these Model Standards);
see also Margaret Shaw et al., National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation
Programs, 31 FAMILY & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 156 (1993) (proposing evaluation and
grievance procedures for court mediation programs).
168. Standard 1.3.2, Appointment, provides that “Mediators shall advise parties that they
will be invited to offer the Mediator feedback on the process at any stage, including offering
written feedback at the conclusion of the mediation,” and Standard 4.4, Feedback, provides:
Unless inappropriate in the circumstances, Mediators will, at the conclusion of
a mediation, invite the parties and advisers and any co-mediators or assistant
mediators, to complete an IMI Feedback Request Form and return it to the
Mediator or to the Reviewer indicated by the Mediator in his/her IMI Profile to
assist in the preparation of the Mediator's Feedback Digest.
Code of Professional Conduct, INT’L MEDIATION INST., §§ 1.3.2, 4.4, https://www.
imimediation.org/practitioners/code-professional-conduct/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2018).
169. See Memorandum from Section of Dispute Resolution Task Force on Research and
Statistics, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Court Adm’rs & ADR Program Adm’rs, Top Ten Pieces of
Information Courts Should Collect on ADR (June 9, 2006), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/events/dispute_resolution/cle_and_mtg_planning_board/teleconference
s/2012-2013/May_2013/topten.authcheckdam.pdf.
170. See Model Surveys, RESOL. SYS. INST., https://www.aboutrsi.org/model-surveys (last
visited Dec. 11, 2018).
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complaints, and a majority of the task force also recommended a process to
monitor the performance of credentialed mediators.171 Over the years,
additional efforts have been undertaken by the ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution’s Court ADR Committee, the Section’s Mediation Committee,
various law schools, and university-related centers to encourage the
collection of feedback and standardized data.
Notably, some individual court-connected and non-profit community
mediation programs have collected data and undertaken evaluation to
improve their services, sometimes on their own initiative, and other times
as a result of funders’ requirements.172 However, it is primarily the Model
Standards’ muted endorsement of transparency and accountability as
expressed in the combination of Standards XI and IX that has played out in
practice. Most mediators and commercial dispute resolution organizations
have expressed relatively little interest in participating in evaluation and
research.173 In general, therefore, the efforts to encourage data collection,
evaluation, and transparency have had little effect.
This paucity of data has mattered. In 2012, the California Legislature
tasked the California Law Revision Commission with determining whether
a potential revision to the Evidence Code, creating an exception to
171. See ABA SECTION OF DISP. RESOL. TASK FORCE ON MEDIATOR CREDENTIALING,
FINAL REPORT (Aug. 2012); see also PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS, supra
note 121, at 7 (Principle 1, Quality and Competence of Services) (“The ADR Provider
Organization should take all reasonable steps to maximize the quality and competence of its
services, absent a clear and prominent disclaimer to the contrary. . . . The ADR Provider
Organization’s responsibilities under this Principle are continuing ones, which requires the
ADR Provider Organization to take all reasonable steps to monitor and evaluate the
performance of its affiliated neutrals.”). Principle VI also provides for complaint and
grievance systems.
172. See Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 927 (2008) (lauding those courtconnected mediation programs that collect and use evaluation data); see also ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE CTS., NEB. OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 2016/2017 ANNUAL CASELOAD REPORT
(n.d.), https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/sites/default/files/2016-2017-ODR-Annual-Report.
pdf (reporting on case volume, referral sources and case dispositions of mediations handled
by Office of Dispute Resolution-approved mediation centers).
173. See Christopher Honeyman, Barbara McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Here There Be
Monsters: At the Edge of the Map of Conflict Resolution, in THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
PRACTITIONER: MONSTERS IN THE WATERS: FEAR AND SUSPICION DIVIDE THE FIELD OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 1 (Office of Dispute Resolution, Ga. Supreme Court, 2001)
(monograph) (describing challenges in collaborations between researchers and dispute
resolution providers to conduct evaluations and empirical research).
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mediation confidentiality, might negatively affect court-connected
mediation. The Commission conducted a multi-jurisdictional,
comprehensive review of court-connected mediation and reported: “It is
clear that mediation is well-established in California. There are many
mediators, lots of mediation programs, and numerous mediations.
Nonetheless, precise statistical information appears to be scarce.”174 In
considering the lack of data on court-connected mediation in California, the
Commission observed:
[E]mpirical research on mediation issues involves significant
challenges. The effectiveness of mediation could be measured in
a variety of ways; there is no standardized, broadly accepted, and
readily administered measuring technique. Collecting data on
mediation programs and analyzing such data is . . . expensive,
slow, time-consuming, and hard to finance when state budgets
are tight and data collection would divert funds and resources
away from direct provision of services to the public. In addition,
“sound empirical data is necessarily hard to obtain given the
confidential nature of most mediation.” In fact, it is even hard to
learn how many mediations occur.175

174. CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIATION
CONFIDENTIALITY AND ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE AND OTHER MISCONDUCT (PRE-PRINT
RECOMMENDATION) 105 (Dec. 2017) (emphasis added) (citing the online information
provided by California counties regarding their court-connected ADR programs). Elsewhere,
the Commission notes that “it is even hard to learn how many mediations occur.” Id. at 92.
175. Id. at 91-92 (citing Gregory Jones, Fighting Capitulation: A Research Agenda for
the Future of Dispute Resolution, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 277, 302-04 (2003) (“I have found
little in the way of measurement of dispute resolution processes, with the notable exception
of the ex post participant satisfaction surveys that have become so common. . . . Efforts at
standardization and consistency in the collection and reporting of longitudinal data are
desperately needed.”); Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, The Court Is in Session: What Judges Say
About Court-Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 377, 430 (2007) (“In this
era of severe budget constraint encompassing the fiscal environment in state and federal
government, great creativity will be needed to generate effective systems to monitor and
evaluate ADR programs.”); Ignazio J. Ruvolo, Appellate Mediation—“Settling” the Last
Frontier of ADR, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177, 188 n.23 (2005) (“[S]ome programs have been
required to limit the resources devoted to the collection of data, thereby making the process
of drawing conclusions about the reasons for programmatic success somewhat more
conjectural than might be desirable.”); Peter Robinson, An Empirical Study of Settlement
Conference Nuts and Bolts: Settlement Judges Facilitating Communication, Compromise,
and Fear, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 102-03 (2012) (California judicial officers were
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Rather than transparency, procedural fairness, or self-determination,
confidentiality arguably has emerged as the defining feature of
mediation.176 At times, mediators’ commitment to confidentiality—
exacerbated by legislatures’ and courts’ interpretation and application of the
mediation privilege—has even demonstrated the potential to enable bad
behavior by parties and lawyers in mediation.177

surveyed on settlement practices in 2000-2004, but results were published in 2012); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J. DISP.
RESOL. 247, 250; see also Coben & Thompson, supra note 4, at 52 n.18 (“Since many
mediations are private matters, it is difficult to determine the number of mediations
conducted in any jurisdiction.”); Jones, supra, at 283 (“Given the importance of process
integrity and confidentiality, how can we measure the performance of alternative dispute
resolution programs, particularly those that are connected to our formal systems of
justice?”); id. at 303 (“We do not even have a good idea about how many mediations are
conducted each year.”); Art Thompson, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil
Litigation in Kansas, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 354 (2003) (“[M]uch of the ADR that
takes place is never reported.”).
The Commission also noted that:
In 2003, an ABA task force developed a list of data fields the courts could use
to determine what ADR data to capture. “The hope [was] that with more similar
data collection across court systems, there [would] be more ability to discern
the impact of ADR on the justice system as a whole.”
CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, supra note 174, at 92 n.510 (quoting McAdoo, supra, at 428
n.270). The Commission also cited Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for CourtConnected Dispute Resolution Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So
Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 592 n.158 (2008), and observed that “[i]t is not
clear to the Commission whether the ABA effort has had much impact; as best we can tell
from extensive reading in the area, the measurement problem persists.” CAL. LAW REVISION
COMM’N, supra note 174, at 92 n.510. The Commission further observed that “[i]n
California, the Judicial Council similarly prepared a model survey for trial courts to use in
collecting ADR data. The Commission does not have information on how extensively the
trial courts have used the model survey.” Id.
The Commission also noted: “Long-term follow-up (such as checking whether a
settlement proves durable) is particularly prohibitive.” Id. at 92 n.511 (citing Lynn
Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be Or . . . ?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 381, 400 (1994) (“[L]ong-term followup is nonexistent.”).
176. See Resnik, The Contingency of Openness, supra note 2, at 1683-85 (reporting that
research regarding courts’ rules revealed that, “to the extent rules address the public or third
parties, the purpose is generally to ensure confidentiality. As currently practiced, ADR
makes most of its processes and outcomes inaccessible. Even as ADR takes place inside
courthouses, it is generally outside the public purview and it displaces public adjudication.”).
177. See Nancy A. Welsh, Musings on Mediation, Kleenex, and (Smudged) White Hats,
33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 5, 14-18 (2011).
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However, there are examples of courts and legislatures requiring
confidentiality to co-exist with measured transparency in order to promote
accountability and public trust in the integrity and quality of mediation.
Perhaps the most notable example involves foreclosure mediation, marked
by significant power disparities between repeat-player mortgage holders
(i.e., banks, loan servicers) on one hand and unsophisticated homeowners
on the other hand.178 In this context, many states have chosen to require
mediator reports regarding the achievement of settlement, the terms of such
agreements, and parties’ compliance with the program’s requirements (e.g.,
authority to settle, document provision, timeliness, etc.).179 Some states
have then made certain information public, while protecting confidentiality
in individual cases.180 The Nevada Supreme Court, for example, decided to
“issue[] a report detailing lender compliance with the program’s statutory
requirements,” including attendance at mediation, production of required
documents, authority to negotiate, and good-faith participation.181 Other
states have published aggregate information regarding foreclosure
mediation settlement rates and the types of outcomes achieved.182 There
have been calls for foreclosure mediation programs around the country to
collect consistent metrics in order to permit cross-jurisdictional evaluation

178. See Nussbaum, ADR’s Place, supra note 148, at 1889, 1893 (pointing out how the
entrance of new players in the mortgage market, with different incentives, undermined the
effectiveness of the procedural safeguards that had existed in the foreclosure process); Jill S.
Tanz & Martha K. McClintock, The Physiologic Stress Response During Mediation, 32
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 29, 52 (2017) (discussing the stress likely experienced by
borrowers in foreclosure mediation).
179. See Alan M. White, Foreclosure Diversion and Mediation in the States, 33 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 411, 443-50 (2017) (discussing various states’ reporting requirements for
foreclosure mediation, as well as the reporting provided for in “foreclosure resolutions”
pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Home Foreclosure Procedures Act, and their
interaction with the confidentiality protections of the Uniform Mediation Act).
180. See Nussbaum, ADR’s Place, supra note 148, at 1936-37, 1950-51.
181. Id. at 1946 (citing Foreclosure Mediation Program, supra note 148 (detailing the
extent to which the six primary loan servicers in Nevada (Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP
Morgan Chase, Ally/GMAC, US Bank, CitiGroup) and others complied with statutory
requirements of the state foreclosure mediation program)).
182. See id. at 1951; see, e.g., Mónica Tabales Maldonado & Alberto Tabales
Maldonado, Compulsory Mediation in Cases of Mortgage Execution: Origin, Effect and
Interrelation with the Loss Mitigation Process, 9 UNIV. P.R. BUS. L.J. 36, 46 (2018), 9 No. 1
UPRBLJ 36 (Westlaw) (English translation of Spanish-langugage title).
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and the development of best practices.183 There have not been calls for an
end to the current level of transparency.
It is therefore time for the Model Standards to acknowledge that in
certain contexts—i.e., when mediation is imposed by a court, legislature, or
contract of adhesion, and mediation’s outcomes are granted expedited
enforcement, with scant judicial review—there is an ethical obligation to
support measured transparency.
V. Options for the Recognition of an Ethical Obligation to Support
Measured Transparency
At this point, it appears that there are at least three different options for
acknowledging a duty to the public and the value of transparency.
A. Revision of the Current Model Standards
The first, most obvious option is to revise the current Model Standards.
Many years have passed since the last revision, and mediation practice has
inevitably evolved. As noted supra, revision of the Model Standards has
already been proposed and is being considered. This revision could be made
as part of a larger package.
Standard IX, “Advancement of Mediation Practice,” already
acknowledges and provides some support for mediators’ role in developing
knowledge regarding the practice of mediation in order to advance its
quality. This standard could be revised—to recognize a duty to the public
and to affirm the value of measured transparency—as follows:
A mediator should shall act in a manner that advances the
practice of mediation and public confidence in it. A mediator
promotes this Standard by engaging in some or all of the
following:

183. See Nussbaum, ADR’s Place, supra note 148, at 1950-51 (citing MELANCA CLARK
& DANIEL OLMOS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION: EMERGING RESEARCH
AND EVALUATION PRACTICES (2011), http://www.justice.gov/atj/foreclosure-mediation.pdf)
(noting recommendations of a working group convened by the U.S. Department of Justice to
permit evaluation); see also Jennifer Shack & Hanna Kaufman, Promoting Access to Justice:
Applying Lessons Learned from Foreclosure Mediation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at
16 (observing the importance of collecting information in order to monitor the effectiveness
of the foreclosure mediation program); Adam Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2281-88 (2017) (describing how anonymous information from
bellwether mediations were used to achieve a global settlement).
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1. Fostering diversity within the field of mediation.
2. Striving to make mediation accessible to those who elect to
use it, including providing services at a reduced rate or on a pro
bono basis as appropriate.
3. Participating in research when given the opportunity,
including obtaining participant feedback when appropriate.
4. Participating in outreach and education efforts to assist the
public in developing an improved understanding of, and
appreciation for, mediation.
5. Supporting and complying with reporting requirements that
assist the public in developing an improved understanding of,
and appreciation for, mediation and its outcomes while also
protecting the anonymity of the parties and abiding by their
reasonable expectations regarding confidentiality.
6. Assisting newer mediators through training, mentoring and
networking.
Revision of the Model Standards will require cooperation from the three
organizations that adopted the 2005 version—the ABA, AAA, and ACR.
That alone suggests one of the most significant challenges posed by this
option. Many within these organizations see no need for revisions to the
Model Standards. In addition, in the thirteen years since the adoption of the
2005 Model Standards, the number of mediators and mediation
organizations has mushroomed. At least some of these individuals and
organizations will want to be consulted as part of any initiative to revise the
Model Standards. These additional voices and viewpoints will make the
revision process even more complex.
Further, as noted supra, many courts, agencies, and organizations have
relied upon the 1994 and 2005 Model Standards as the templates for their
own ethical requirements, and they may resist revisiting them. In addition,
many mediators are unlikely to perceive a sufficient need for such
wholesale revisions. Indeed, some commentators have already expressed
such views.184

184. See Ty Holt, Judith Meyer, Susan Podziba & Sharon Press, On Professional
Practice, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2017, at 35.
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Revision of the current Model Standards may represent the best option in
an ideal world, but it would present very real logistical and political
challenges.
B. The Addition of Commentary to the Current Model Standards
Another option is to supplement the current Model Standards with
Explanatory Comments, as is done in other contexts.185 Such Explanatory
Comments could consider the application of various standards to mediation,
particularly when the process is imposed upon people by the courts or
pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute mediation clauses in contracts of
adhesion. As this Article has suggested, the imposition of mediation,
accompanied by de facto limits on judicial review and expedited judicial
enforcement, could trigger a second and more demanding interpretation of
the Preamble’s reference to “public confidence in mediation,” various
standards’ declaration of the importance of protecting the integrity and
quality of the process, and the provisions of Standard IX, “Advancement of
Mediation Practice.”
The key question with this option is whether an Explanatory Comment
will have any meaningful effect. The ABA Section of Dispute Resolution’s
Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance produces advisory opinions on
the application of the Model Standards, with a similar goal of influencing
practice while avoiding the logistical and political challenges of revising the
black letter. The Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance issued its first
advisory opinion on August 6, 2007, and has continued to issue advisory
opinions.186 Although there are occasional references to these opinions,187 it
is not clear that they have had a significant effect on mediation practice.

185. See Memorandum from Samuel Jackson to ABA Section of Dispute Resolution
Council (on file with author).
186. See Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://web.archive.
org/web/20160701050402/http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=DR018600
&edit=1 (last visited Jan 13, 2019).
187. See, e.g., Robert Kirkman Collins, The Scrivener’s Dilemma in Divorce Mediation:
Promulgating Progressive Professional Parameters, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 691,
701 (2016) (regarding mediators’ drafting of settlement agreements); Sharon Press & Paul
M. Lurie, Protecting Self-Determination in Mediation, GPSOLO MAG., July/Aug. 2014, 74,
75 (recommending that mediators turn to the Committee for advice on the effect of
evaluation on self-determination).
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C. The Creation of Customized Standards for “Imposed Mediation”
Although the Model Standards purport to apply to all forms of
mediation, there are also customized ethical standards that have been
developed for particular areas of mediation practice. According to the
Reporter’s Notes, the joint committee that developed the 2005 Model
Standards anticipated such developments.188
One example of customized standards is the Model Standards of Practice
for Family and Divorce Mediation (“Family Model Standards”), referenced
supra. Unlike the Model Standards, the Family Model Standards require
family mediators to engage in various affirmative actions: “assist[ing]
participants in determining how to promote the best interests of
children,”189 “recogniz[ing]” family situations involving child abuse or
neglect and domestic abuse, “and tak[ing] appropriate steps to shape the
mediation process accordingly.”190 The Family Model Standards also
require mediators to suspend or terminate mediations when the “mediator
reasonably believes that a participant is unable to effectively participate or
for other compelling reasons.”191 Two possible reasons are when “the
participants are about to enter into an agreement that the mediator
reasonably believes to be unconscionable”192 or when “a participant is using
the mediation process to gain an unfair advantage.”193 These provisions go
188. The Reporter’s Notes, under Guiding Principles, provide:
The members of the Joint Committee adopted the following principles to
govern their work: . . . B. The Standards should retain their original function of
serving as fundamental, basic ethical guidelines for persons mediating in all
practice contexts while simultaneously recognizing that mediation practice in
selected contexts may require additional standards in order to insure process
integrity.
Reporter’s Notes, supra note 162, at 2.
189. Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice, supra note
167, at Standard VIII.
190. Id. at Standards IX and X.
191. Id. at Standard XI.
192. Id. at Standard XI.A.4.
193. Id. at Standard XI.A.6; see also Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 168, at
Standard 4.3.2, Termination of the Process.
Mediators shall withdraw from a mediation if a negotiation among the parties
appears to be moving toward an unconscionable or illegal outcome. An
unconscionable outcome is one which is the product of undue pressure,
exploitation or duress. An unconscionable outcome reflects one party’s
exploitation of an existing power imbalance to the degree that the resulting
agreement “shocks the conscience” and violates accepted legal and cultural
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well beyond those contained in the Model Standards applicable to all
mediators. As discussed supra, the Family Model Standards also reference
principles for the regulation of mediators and court-connected family
mediation programs. Particularly relevant are the standards that continue to
protect confidentiality in individual cases but provide for monitoring,
aggregate reporting, and measured transparency in order to ensure
mediation quality and consumer protection.194
As discussed supra, the specialized area of foreclosure mediation has
also developed a rebalancing of transparency and confidentiality. Although
there are not customized ethical standards for foreclosure mediators, state
statutes and court rules have created a sort of workaround to the
confidentiality restrictions that might otherwise apply.
The option of creating customized ethics standards for “imposed
mediation” is very appealing. It would acknowledge that mediation
occurring pursuant to mandates by courts, legislatures, or contracts of
adhesion is different, and that its circumstances require a heightened level
of public accountability. Thus, there is a need for a targeted, tailored
rebalancing in this context between transparency and confidentiality. The
Family Model Standards could serve as both precedent and template.
This option likely would encounter its own logistical and political
challenges, but they should be much fewer than those that would occur with
an attempt to engage in a wholesale revision of the Model Standards. Thus,
from a cost-benefit perspective, this is the strongest option. It responds to
the particular circumstances that require increased transparency, avoids
encroaching on other areas of mediation practice, and is the most likely to
be adopted and implemented.

norms of fairness.
Id.
194. Ass’n of Family & Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice, supra note
167, ¶ C (at end); see also Lydia Nussbaum, Mediator Burnout, 34 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. (forthcoming, on file with author) (manuscript at 46) (also concerned about
mediation quality) (“[C]ourt administrators who oversee mediation staff or a roster of
contract mediators could adopt a policy to define efficiency not by settlement rates but by
other metrics, such as party perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with the process, which
would require a commitment to use appropriate survey instruments to gather parties’
feedback. Or, judges could adopt new court rules that would require all judges to include, in
a prove-up of any mediated agreement, questions to assess whether the parties felt pressured
to settle by the mediator and rejecting agreements where parties say ‘yes’.”).
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Conclusion
In reviewing and deciding to support the CFPB’s Arbitration Reporting
Proposal, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution found the benefits of the
Proposal to be three-fold. First, the availability of redacted filings and other
information was intended to equalize to some degree the knowledge of “one
shot” users of consumer arbitration in comparison to “repeat players.” The
Section concluded that such knowledge was likely to assist these “one shot”
users as they considered whether to pursue arbitration, which arbitrators to
select, and how to prepare for their arbitration proceedings.195 Second, the
Section found that the availability of this information would permit public
195. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-100 (1974) (noting the significant
advantages that repeat players enjoy in comparison to one-time players—e.g., experience
leading to changes in how the repeat player structures the next similar transaction; expertise,
economies of scale, and access to specialist advocates; informal continuing relationships
with institutional incumbents; bargaining reputation and credibility; long-term strategies
facilitating risk-taking in appropriate cases; influencing rules through lobbying and other use
of resources; playing for precedent and favorable future rules; distinguishing between
symbolic and actual defeats; and investing resources in getting rules favorable to them
implemented—and contrasting these to disadvantages borne by one-time players—e.g., more
at stake in given case; more risk averse; more interested in immediate over long-term gain;
less interested in precedent and favorable rules; not able to form continuing relationships
with courts or institutional representatives; not able to use experience to structure future
similar transactions; limited access to specialist advocates); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL‘Y J. 189, 195 (1997); Lisa B.
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial
Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 225–27 (1998)
(observing that repeat-player employers fare better in arbitration than one-shot employees,
that when repeat-player employers lose, damages are lower than for one-time employers, and
generally that enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements allows employers to
structure the arbitration process to their advantage); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 42.
Empirical research consistently indicates that repeat players in consumer arbitration are
more likely to “win”—but it must be noted that this is also true in litigation. See Welsh,
Class Action-Barring Mandatory Pre-Dispute Consumer Arbitration Clauses, supra note 6,
at 419-20 (summarizing empirical research examining the occurrence and potential reasons
for repeat-player bias in consumer arbitration). Recent empirical work indicates that this
pattern may have more to do with companies’ representation by lawyers who have become
extreme repeat players, since individual consumers are very unlikely to be represented by
lawyers who are extreme repeat players. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 6. There
are now suggestions that one-shot players might increase transparency and improve their
experience in consumer arbitration if they are trained to identify key procedural elements
and then upload these and other information to an online platform that would be widely
accessible. See Amsler, supra note 6.
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oversight and enable an overall, systemic picture of the consumer
arbitration process’s operation and effects. For example, to the extent that
some type of systematic frequency or lack of frequency of appointment of
certain arbitrators and the outcomes of those cases could be evaluated,
required reporting and publication would provide a means for the CFPB
and other public entities to engage in oversight and assessment. Third, the
fact of disclosure would make it less likely that dispute resolution providers
would engage in behaviors or relationships that raised doubts regarding
their impartiality or legitimacy, and transparency would assure parties and
the public of such impartiality and legitimacy. Ultimately, the Section
found that:
[T]he reporting and publication proposed by the CFPB—and the
consequent availability of the information for those participating
in consumer arbitration, those researching consumer arbitration,
and those overseeing consumer arbitration—will help to protect
the integrity of arbitration and, by extension, the integrity of the
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration that has been
expressed by the Supreme Court.196
The Section also concluded that transparency was particularly important
when one of the parties to a dispute was imposing a dispute resolution
process upon the other party, and the courts might be asked to enforce, and
thus lend their coercive power and legitimacy to, the award produced by the
process. These characteristics of mandatory pre-dispute consumer
arbitration in the context of financial services and products were
particularly important to the Section as it assessed the likelihood that the
CFPB’s proposal would assist with achieving fairness, efficiency,
accountability, and good governance.197
The Section also observed that dispute resolution organizations,
arbitrators, and parties should welcome reporting requirements and potential
public scrutiny. Transparency would enable analysis, improvement, and

196. Letter from Nancy A. Welsh, Chair-Elect, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, to
Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 29, 2016).
197. See G.A. RES. 69/116, 1 (Dec. 10, 2014) (United Nations Convention on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration) (referencing a belief “that the
Rules on Transparency contribute significantly to the establishment of a harmonized legal
framework for a fair and efficient settlement of international investment disputes, increase
transparency and accountability and promote good governance”).
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comprehension198 of a consumer arbitration system that had been largely
opaque.
All of this reasoning applies just as strongly to mediation as it does to
arbitration, particularly as mediation is being imposed by courts,
legislatures, or contracts of adhesion, and the courts are exercising both
deferential review and expedited enforcement of the resulting settlement
agreements. In this context, mediators should also welcome a targeted
rebalancing
of
transparency
and
confidentiality—“measured
transparency”—to support the integrity of, and public confidence in, the
mediation process. Meanwhile, the current interest in revising the Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators creates the opportunity to achieve such
rebalancing through the development of a set of ethics standards
customized for imposed mediation.
It is time to establish dispute resolution neutrals’ ethical obligation to
support transparency. And mediators can lead the way.

198. Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in
International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 587, 613-16 (1998).

